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The Legal Ramifications of Christian
Nationalism
Steven K. Green*
INTRODUCTION

One of the more resilient debates about American
constitutional history is the one over the nation’s purported
religious founding. As predictable as the Chicago Cubs’ collapse
every summer, legal and religious conservatives periodically raise
claims about America’s Christian heritage in their efforts to gain
the moral and legal high ground in the ongoing culture wars. One
recent example of this is found in the June 24, 2018, Sunday sermon
of Reverend Robert Jeffress of First Baptist Church of Dallas,
Texas.1 In that sermon, titled “America is a Christian Nation,”
Reverend Jeffress asserted that the nation’s Founders were
predominately evangelical Christians and that they intended to
instill Christian values in the nation’s governing documents.2
America was founded as a Christian nation, Jeffress insisted, and
the nation’s law and institutions needed to rediscover and reaffirm
this basis.3
While Reverend Jeffress’s claims could be passed off as the
ramblings of a fundamentalist preacher, Dallas First Baptist is
* Steven K. Green is the Fred H. Paulus Professor of Law and Affiliated
Professor of History and Religious Studies at Willamette University. In addition, Professor Green directs the interdisciplinary Center for Religion, Law and
Democracy, one of Willamette’s Centers of Excellence.
1. Robert Jeffress, America Is a Christian Nation, FIRST BAPTIST DALLAS
(June 24, 2018), https://www.firstdallas.org/media/worship/america-is-a-christian-nation/ [https://perma.cc/LZ79-4JNS].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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considered one of the more prestigious congregations in the nation’s
largest Protestant denomination.4 And Reverend Jeffress is not
alone in his assertions—he is part of a large group of political and
religious figures who raise similar truth-claims and use Christian
nation arguments to promote a conservative social and political
agenda.5 More than a handful of Christian Nationalists have
access to the holders of the nation’s political and judicial power;
Jeffress, for one, was among President Donald Trump’s closest
religious advisors, serving on his Evangelical Advisory Board.6
Although claims that America was founded as a Christian nation
have existed for a long time, ebbing and flowing in response to
cultural forces,7 the maxim witnessed a resurgence in the latter
decades of the twentieth century, carrying over into the twenty-first
century.8 Investigative journalists at Religion Dispatches and
Church & State magazine have documented the rise in Christian
nationalism for some time,9 and in 2019 the moderate-leaning
Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty (BJC) launched an
initiative to combat this trend, “Christians Against Christian
Nationalism,” with the BJC’s director declaring that the “threat of
4. Daniel Silliman, At Jeffress’ First Baptist Church of Dallas, Trump
Support is Part of a 150-Year Tradition, RELIGION DISPATCHES (July 31, 2018),
https://religiondispatches.org/at-jeffress-first-baptist-church-of-dallas-trumpsupport-is-part-of-a-150-year-tradition/ [https://perma.cc/BUD7-NKNE].
5. See, e.g., Rob Boston, All the President’s Men and Women: Members Of
Trump’s Evangelical Advisory Board Are Hard at Work Changing Public Policy
– But They’d Rather You Not Know About It, CHURCH & STATE MAGAZINE (Oct.
2018),
https://www.au.org/church-state/october-2018-church-state/coverstory/all-the-presidents-men-and-women-members-of [https://perma.cc/VC4X9K77].
6. See id.; Liz Hayes, The Apostle of Trump: The Rev. Robert Jeffress
Wasn’t Known to Most Americans Before He Emerged As President’s Chief
Evangelical Defender, CHURCH & STATE MAGAZINE (July/Aug. 2018),
https://www.au.org/church-state/julyaugust-2018-church-state-magazine/featured/the-apostle-of-trump-the-rev-robert [https://perma.cc/28NK-5QK5].
7. See generally STEVEN K. GREEN, INVENTING A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE
MYTH OF THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDING (2015).
8. See Liz Theoharis, The rise of Christian Nationalism in America,
SALON (Oct. 4, 2020), https://www.salon.com/2020/10/04/the-rise-of-christiannationalism-in-america-_partner/ [https://perma.cc/JM4W-KUNA].
9. See, e.g., Simon Brown, Founded On Faith?, CHURCH & STATE
MAGAZINE (July/Aug. 2015), https://www.au.org/church-state/julyaugust-2015church-state/featured/founded-on-faith [perma.cc/27GK-J5QU]; see also Silliman, supra note 4.
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Christian Nationalism has reached [a] high tide.”10 Indeed, some
scholars have maintained that the election of Donald Trump as
president in 2016 can be explained in part by Trump’s loaded
rhetoric that appealed to Christian nationalist voters.11
Before proceeding further, the proposition that America is a
Christian nation requires defining, as does the impulse of Christian
nationalism. Defining the former is more difficult than it looks, as
the concept of America being a Christian nation has a protean
quality. A high degree of scholarly consensus exists about the
religious impulses behind the settling of the British-American
colonies and the significant role that religious rhetoric played
during the founding period that inspired popular support for the
revolutionary and republican causes.12 Scholars also generally
agree that the evangelical revivals of the 1740s spawned nascent
democratic impulses by emphasizing liberty of conscience and
turning religious affiliation into a voluntary enterprise.13 There is
much less agreement over whether there was a direct connection
between Calvinist-covenantal theology and Biblical principles on
one side and the sources of republican ideology on the other side.14
Proceeding further in this taxonomy, a smaller number of scholars
and popular writers argue that a Protestant ethos pervaded the
10. Amanda Tyler, Opinion, Threat of Christian Nationalism Has Reached
High Tide, GOOD FAITH MEDIA (July 30, 2019), https://goodfaithmedia.org/threat-of-christian-nationalism-has-reached-high-tide/
[perma.cc/4LAT-ZBEZ].
11. Andrew L. Whitehead, Samuel L. Perry & Joseph O. Baker, Make
America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism & Voting for Donald Trump
in the 2016 Presidential Election, 73 SOC. RELIGION 147, 153 (2018).
12. See generally CATHERINE L. ALBANESE, SONS OF THE FATHERS: THE CIVIL
RELIGION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1976); RUTH H. BLOCH, VISIONARY
REPUBLIC: MILLENNIAL THEMES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1756–1800 (1985);
NATHAN O. HATCH, THE SACRED CAUSE OF LIBERTY: REPUBLICAN THOUGHT AND
THE MILLENNIUM IN REVOLUTIONARY NEW ENGLAND (1977); THOMAS S. KIDD,
GOD OF LIBERTY: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2010);
MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM
LINCOLN (2002).
13. See generally CEDRIC B. COWING, THE GREAT AWAKENING AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: COLONIAL THOUGHT IN THE 18TH CENTURY (1971); ALAN
HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE GREAT AWAKENING TO
THE REVOLUTION (1966); FRANK LAMBERT, INVENTING THE “GREAT AWAKENING”
(1999).
14. See MARK A. NOLL, NATHAN O. HATCH & GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE
SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN AMERICA 70–106 (1983).
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founding period—rather than a post-Enlightenment one—and that
the ubiquitous religious rhetoric indicates that: (1) the majority of
people, including the political leadership, held orthodox-Christian
beliefs; and (2) that framers of the nation’s governing documents
intended to incorporate Christian principles into them.15 Finally,
an even smaller number of writers and politicians claim that the
United States was specially blessed or chosen by God, that his
providential hand directed the framers in the nation’s founding.16
Under this last perspective, the nation’s past and founding
documents assume an almost sacred quality.
As can be
appreciated, due to the variety of potential understandings and
fluidity between perspectives, it can be difficult to decipher what
one means when speaking of America’s Christian heritage or of it
being a “Christian nation.”17
As a result, rhetoric about America’s Christian founding can
appeal to a wide audience. Many people hold vague, if not illdefined ideas about America’s Christian nationhood.18 A study by
the First Amendment Center revealed that over fifty percent of
Americans believe that the U.S. Constitution created a Christian
nation, notwithstanding its express prohibitions on religious
establishments and religious tests for public office holding.19 A
15. See MARK D. HALL, DID AMERICA HAVE A CHRISTIAN FOUNDING?
SEPARATING MODERN MYTH FROM HISTORICAL TRUTH 23–55 (2019).
16. See generally GARY DEMAR, AMERICA’S CHRISTIAN HISTORY: THE
UNTOLD STORY (1995); JOHN FEA, WAS AMERICA FOUNDED AS A CHRISTIAN
NATION?: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION (2011); TIM LAHAYE, FAITH OF OUR
FOUNDING FATHERS (1987). In a 2000 study, sociologist Christian Smith identified six meanings of a “Christian America” among evangelicals, with the more
common conceptions being that America was founded by people in search of
religious liberty, that the laws and structures of American government incorporated Christian principles, and that the Founders were devout Christians or
theists who sought God’s will in founding the nation. CHRISTIAN SMITH,
CHRISTIAN AMERICA? WHAT EVANGELICALS REALLY WANT 26–37 (2000).
17. FEA, supra note 16, xiv–xvi.
18. See David Barton, Is America a Christian Nation?, WALL BUILDERS,
https://wallbuilders.com/america-christian-nation/
[perma.cc/R7PJ-RBCD]
(last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
19. FREEDOM FORUM INST., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2008 3 (2008),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/
FAC_sofa_2008report.pdf [perma.cc/3J37-HPQ3] (indicating that 63% of
Americans either strongly or mildly agree that “the nation’s founders intended
the United States to be a Christian nation,” while 55% either strongly or mildly
agree that “the U.S. Constitution establishes a Christian nation”).
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similar study conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion in Public
Life revealed even higher numbers, noting that “Americans
overwhelmingly consider the U.S. a Christian nation: Two-in-three
(67%) characterize the nation this way.”20 Other studies indicate
that a majority of Americans believe that the nation’s political
operations should be based on “Judeo-Christian principles,” if the
nation’s founding principles are not already.21
Politicians are notorious for playing on these prepossessions
and, in turn, reinforcing this narrative. Christian nation rhetoric
is such low-hanging fruit that many politicians cannot resist
making at least vague claims. At times, such rhetoric is used as a
ceremonial flourish; at other times, the claims are more robust.
President Ronald Reagan, who was not a devout church-goer,
despite his support from the evangelical Religious Right, regularly
alluded to the nation’s providential past, remarking in one speech:
“[c]an we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land, this
island of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world
who yearn to breathe free?”22 In a 1984 prayer breakfast he
declared that “faith and religion play a critical role in the political
life of our nation,” asserting that the Founders had affirmed this
relationship in the founding documents: “Those who created our
country,” Reagan remarked, “understood that there is a divine
order which transcends the human order.”23 And President George
W. Bush, a conservative evangelical, frequently revealed his belief
in America’s Christian origins, once affirming that: “[o]ur country
was founded by men and women who realized their dependence on
God and were humbled by His providence and grace.”24 According
to Bush, the Founders did not simply acknowledge their obligation
toward God; they (like Bush) believed that America was specially
20. Many Americans Uneasy with Mix of Religion and Politics, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 24, 2006), https://www.pewforum.org/2006/08/24/manyamericans-uneasy-with-mix-of-religion-and-politics/ [perma.cc/47DA-RWZZ].
21. Mariana Servin-Gonzalez & Oscar Torres-Reyna, The Polls-Trends:
Religion and Politics, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 592, 604 (1999).
22. RICHARD V. PIERARD & ROBERT D. LINDER, CIVIL RELIGION AND THE
PRESIDENCY 273–74 (1988).
23. Ronald Reagan, Politics and Morality are Inseparable, 1 NORTE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7, 7 (1985).
24. President’s Thanksgiving Day Proclamation, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 22,
2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/presidentsthanksgiving-day-proclamation/ [perma.cc/4F42-BDVM].
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chosen, “not because we consider ourselves a chosen nation” but
because “God moves and chooses [us] as He wills.”25
Whether intended or not, such rhetoric has fueled a meaty
variant of the Christian nation maxim, one that is being pushed by
a new wave of Christian Nationalists.26 In books, articles, and
reports, they document the extensive use of religious discourse
during the founding period and the various public affirmations of
God and religion—such as Thanksgiving day proclamations—to
construct a conclusive narrative about America’s religious
origins.27 As one author wrote: “[t]he history of America’s laws, its
constitutional system, the reason for the American Revolution, or
the basis of its guiding political philosophy cannot accurately be
discussed without reference to its biblical roots.”28
Not only do Christian Nationalists promote the meatier
versions of the maxim, they seek to move beyond the symbolic to
“return” the nation and its policies to its Christian roots.29 They
argue that scholars, judges, and the liberal elite have censored
America’s Christian past in a conspiracy to install a regime of
secularism.30 The absence of this narrative from public school and
25. President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address, NPR (Jan. 20, 2005),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4460172
[https://perma.cc/P77K-BHCQ]; see also RICHARD T. HUGHES, CHRISTIAN
AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD 157–70 (2009) (detailing the relationship
between President George W. Bush and conservative religious voters).
26. See, e.g., ANDREW L. SEIDEL, THE FOUNDING MYTH: WHY CHRISTIAN
NATIONALISM IS UN-AMERICAN 8–12 (2019); KATHERINE STEWART, THE POWER
WORSHIPPERS: INSIDE THE DANGEROUS RISE OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM (2020);
ANDREW L. WHITEHEAD & SAMUEL L. PERRY, TAKING AMERICA BACK FOR GOD:
CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES passim (2020).
27. See generally GARY T. AMOS, DEFENDING THE DECLARATION: HOW THE
BIBLE AND CHRISTIANITY INFLUENCED THE WRITING OF THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1989); DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION (5th ed. 2011); DAVID BARTON, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH & STATE: WHAT THE FOUNDERS MEANT (2007); DAVID BARTON,
AMERICA’S GODLY HERITAGE (1993); DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION:
WHAT IS THE CORRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE? (1992)
[hereinafter MYTH OF SEPARATION]; DEMAR, supra note 16; JOHN EIDSMOE,
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS
(1987); JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1982).
28. BENJAMIN HART, FAITH & FREEDOM: THE CHRISTIAN ROOTS OF AMERICAN
LIBERTY 19 (1988).
29. See WHITEHEAD & PERRY, supra note 26, at 55–119.
30. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 5.
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college history texts reveals a bias against the Christian
perspective; as one author wrote: “[t]he removal of religion as
history from our schoolbooks betrays the intellectual dishonesty of
secular humanist educators and reveals their blind hostility to
Christianity.”31 It is nothing less than the “deliberate rape of
history.”32 As a scholar sums up this phenomenon:
The number of contemporary authors on the quest for a
Christian America is legion. The Christian America
concept moves beyond a simple and fundamental
acknowledgement of Christianity’s significance in
American history to a belief that the United States was
established as a decidedly Christian nation. Driven by the
belief that separation of church and state is a myth foisted
upon the American people by secular courts and scholars,
defenders of Christian America historiography claim they
are merely recovering accurate American history from
revisionist historians conspiring to expunge any remnant
of Christianity from America’s past.33
This narrative, when communicated to sympathetic listeners,
usually calls for a response. Increasingly, its promoters have urged
the integration of a Christian nation perspective into law and
policy.34 One example was a 2007 resolution in the United States
House of Representatives that called for “[a]ffirming the rich
spiritual and religious history of our Nation’s founding and
subsequent history and expressing support for designation of the
first week in May as ‘American Religious History Week’ for the
appreciation of and education on America’s history of religious
faith.”35 Beginning in 2010, the Texas State Board of Education—
a partisan elected entity controlled by Republicans—undertook to
rewrite the state’s social science curriculum to reflect aspects of a

31. See LAHAYE, supra note 16, at 2.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Stephen M. Stookey, In God We Trust? Evangelical Historiography
and the Quest for a Christian America, 41 SW. J. OF THEOLOGY 41, 42 (1999).
34. See H.R. Res. 888, 110th Cong. (2007), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
110th-congress/house-resolution/888/text [https://perma.cc/TW5M-GHZ3].
35. Id. (the resolution stalled in committee).

2021]

IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION?

437

Christian nationalist approach.36 More recently, the Congressional
Prayer Caucus Foundation—an organization with ties to several
Christian right groups—instituted a massive legislative agenda
(“Project Blitz”) to encourage state legislatures to enact laws that
promote “Our Country’s Religious Heritage” in public schools and
in other public settings.37
So long as claims about the Christian founding of the nation’s
political institutions remain in the rhetorical realm, there is less
cause for concern, at least constitutionally. But, as this Article
explores, Christian nation rhetoric has long influenced judicial
decision-making, and variants of the maxim impact current
Supreme Court church-state jurisprudence. This Article explores
the legal ramifications of the Christian nation maxim and how it
has affected outcomes in church-state cases in subtle, but also
significant ways. This Article also explores how in the process the
Court has used, and misused, the historical record to reach many of
its conclusions about church-state matters.
I.

INVENTING A CHRISTIAN AMERICA

A paradox arises when considering whether America is
Christian in a legal or constitutional sense, such that the nation’s
laws and policies should reflect and reinforce a Christian
perspective. What this means in conventional terms is that
legislatures would (and should) be able to enact legislation that
promotes Christian values and that the Constitution’s
Establishment Clause would be interpreted in such a way as to
accommodate, if not protect, such policies (presumably, the Free
Exercise Clause would also be reinterpreted to remove any
prohibition on religious favoritism of Christianity or on disfavoring
non-Christian traditions in the receipt of benefits).
36. See Mark A. Chancey, Rewriting History for a Christian America: Religion and the Texas Social Studies Controversy of 2009–2010, 94 J. OF
RELIGION 325, 325 (2014); see also Russell Shorto, How Christian Were the
TIMES
(Feb.
11,
2010),
https://www.nyFounders?,
N.Y.
times.com/2010/02/14/magazine/14texbooks-t.html
[https://perma.cc/2RUL492M].
37. See WHITEHEAD & PERRY, supra note 26, at 159; see also Frederick
Clarkson, Ringing in a Christian Nationalist 2019 With an Even Larger Legislative Playbook, RELIGION DISPATCHES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://religiondispatches.org/ringing-in-a-christian-nationalist-2019-with-an-even-larger-legislative-playbook/ [perma.cc/T52C-DWXJ].
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The reason a paradox exists is that notwithstanding the
presence of religious discourse during the founding period,
including affirmations of God’s providential hand in the nation’s
creation, the nation’s core founding documents are bereft of
references to religious principles or affirmations of God’s authority
To be sure, the Articles of
for republican governance.38
Confederation conclude with an assertion that uniting the states
under one government “pleased the Great Governor of the World,”
but that reference is hortatory, containing no claim that the
authority for government comes from God.39 Similarly, the
Declaration of Independence contains four references to or
affirmations of a deity, but these references are in Enlightenment
natural law terms—“Nature’s God,” “Creator,” “Supreme Judge of
No doubt, Thomas
the world,” and “divine Providence.”40
Jefferson—who included only the first two terms in his draft41—
appreciated the power of religious allusions, particularly during a
time of war, and understood that these deific references would
appeal to rationalists and orthodox Christians alike. But these
deific affirmations, couched in Enlightenment terms, do not support
a Christian basis for the Declaration, republicanism, or the new
government. On the contrary, the Declaration is clear that the
authority for rebellion, independence, and the confederation of
states rested on “self-evident” truths and the “consent of the
governed,” not on some higher source.42
In contrast to those hortatory declarations, the Constitution is
bereft of even a passing nod to God.43 Authority to establish the

38. See Jared A. Goldstein, How the Constitution Became Christian, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 259, 267 (2017); see also Is America a Christian Nation?, AM.
UNITED, https://www.au.org/resources/publications/is-america-a-christian-nation [https://perma.cc/24U8-66N6] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
39. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, LIBRARY OF CONG.,
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/uscode/uscode1952-00100/uscode1952-001000005/uscode1952-001000005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88Y2AM8D] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
40. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript
[perma.cc/FA37-HV3X] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
41. See 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1760–
1776, 243–47 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
42. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 163–73.
43. See Goldstein, supra note 38, at 267.
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new United States is derived from “We, the people.”44 The absence
of an affirmation of God, even one in Enlightenment terms, is
remarkable considering that the majority of contemporary state
constitutions contained deistic affirmations.45 So, in that context,
the omission is significant. This does not mean that the drafters
intended to create a “Godless Constitution” in the sense of it being
an antireligious or irreligious document, but one can fairly infer
that the omission was purposeful, considering the prevailing
practice with state constitutions, such that the drafters intended to
place the authority for republican government on human will.46
The omission did not go unnoticed. In fact, two of the more
contentious points about the Constitution that Anti-Federalists
raised during the ratification debates were that the Constitution
lacked a deific affirmation and that it banned any religious
prerequisite for public office-holding, the latter also being common
in state constitutions.47 Speaking for many Anti-Federalists, the
Virginia Independent Chronicle declared that these two reinforcing
aspects to the Constitution revealed a “cold indifference towards
religion.”48 As a remedy, one delegate to the Connecticut ratifying
convention called for adding “an explicit acknowledgement of the
being of a God, [of] his perfections and his providence” in the
Constitution.49 And an essayist in the Boston Independent
Chronicle charged that “all religion is expressly rejected[ ] from the
Constitution. Was there ever any State or kingdom that should
subsist without adopting some system of religion?”50 The answer,
44. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
45. See Allan W. Vestal, The Lingering Bigotry of State Constitution Religious Tests, 15 U. MD. L.J. OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 55, 56 (2015).
46. ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION:
THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 24–45 (1996).
47. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 183.
48. A Proposal for Reviving Christian Conviction, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Oct.
31, 1787, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 125, 126–27 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981).
49. Letter of William Williams, AM. MERCURY, Feb. 11, 1788, reprinted in
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787–1788, 207, 207 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1892).
50. Essay by Samuel, INDEP. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER (Boston),
Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 191, 195 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981).
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so far as it concerned the Constitution, was apparently “yes.”
Scholars have generally agreed that the ideological sources for
ideas about republican governance came from classical models (i.e.,
the Greek and Roman republics), the common law, Enlightenment
theorists (John Locke, Baron Montesquieu, etc.), and Whig writers,
not from Christianity.51
Contemporaries acknowledged the irreligious character of the
Constitution, or at least that its authority came from the people,
rather than from a higher source. Even orthodox clergy who were
prone to making providential claims, agreed about the nation’s
secular foundations. Speaking in a 1791 Fourth of July sermon,
Presbyterian minister William Linn advanced a popular Calvinist
narrative of analogizing the union of states to the tribes of Old
Testament Israel as a way of declaring the nation’s chosen status.52
At the same time, however, Linn acknowledged that constitutional
authority was based on the “representation of the people from
whom all legitimate government is derived.”53 He contrasted the
new republican government with “[the] government which Jesus
Christ hath instituted in his Church [which] is distinct from the
power which appertains to the kingdoms of this world.”54 Several
years later, as the nation became embroiled in financial crisis and
international intrigue, the absence of a religious foundation for the
government became a cause for concern.55 Presbyterian minister

51. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 22–54 (1967).
52. See WILLIAM LINN, THE BLESSINGS OF AMERICA 9 (1791); see also ENOS
HITCHCOCK, AN ORATION IN COMMEMORATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1793), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, 1171, 1173-83 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed.
1998) (extolling the virtues of the United States’ republican government as the
progeny of great civilizations, but surpassing their limitations); JOHN THAYER,
A DISCOURSE DELIVERED AT THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN BOSTON (1798),
reprinted in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, supra, at
1341, 1343–61 (urging the listeners to respect the government as established
in the United States Constitution and cautioning them against insubordination lest they follow in the footsteps of revolutionary France, with its deleterious effects on religious institutions).
53. LINN, supra note 52, at 17.
54. Id. at 19.
55. See 3 JOHN M. MASON, Divine Judgments, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
JOHN M. MASON 39, 53 (Ebenezer Mason ed., 1852).
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John Mason bemoaned that while the nation had received God’s
blessings:
[T]hat very [C]onstitution which the singular goodness of
God enabled us to establish, does not so much as recognize
his being! . . . [F]rom the constitution of the United States,
it is impossible to ascertain what God we worship; or
whether we own a God at all. . . . Should the citizens of
America be as irreligious as her constitution, we will have
reason to tremble lest the Governor of the universe . . .
crush us to atoms.56
This lament about the irreligious nature of the government
continued into the 1800 presidential election where orthodox clergy
charged that Thomas Jefferson’s election would perpetuate a “civil
society as founded in Atheism.”57 John Mason again raised the
charge that the “Federal Constitution makes no acknowledgement
of that God who gave us our national existence.”58 In “the pride of
our citizenship,” Mason declared, the Founders had “forgotten our
Christianity.”59
If members of the founding generation largely agreed that the
nation’s governing documents were based on secular, rational
principles, then how did the narrative arise about the nation’s
Christian origins? Several events came together in the early
nineteenth century to support the belief that America was founded
as a Christian nation. The first event that fueled a reevaluation of
the nation’s founding was the extensive growth in evangelical
Protestantism in the early 1800s, fueled by a proliferation of
revivals, commonly called the Second Great Awakening.60 This
expansion of an evangelical perspective coincided with a general
discrediting of deistic and rationalist thought as a result of popular
revulsion of the excesses of the French Revolution.61 In addition to
seeking reaffirmations of piety in the public realm, evangelicals
shared an eschatology (post-millennialism) that taught that Jesus’
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. 4 JOHN M. MASON, Voice of Warning, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF JOHN
M. MASON 533, 552 (Ebenezer Mason ed., 1852).
58. Id. at 570.
59. Id. at 561; see also GREEN, supra note 7, at 190–98.
60. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 201.
61. See id. at 211–12.
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second coming would occur after a thousand-year reign of a godly
society brought about by Christians.62 Evangelicals dusted off
Puritan motifs of America being specially chosen by God to be an
exemplar to the world.63 The belief that God’s kingdom would
become manifest in America necessitated a reconsideration of the
nation’s founding, which evangelical leaders quickly set out to
sanctify.64 By the 1820s, evangelical authors were making claims
about how God had directed the Founders in their political
endeavors. Evangelical reformer Lyman Beecher declared in the
1820s that “our own republic, in its constitution and laws, is of
heavenly origin. It was not borrowed from Greece or Rome, but
from the Bible.”65 Similarly, Reverend Jasper Adams, nephew and
cousin to presidents, published a sermon in 1833 that asserted that
the United States had sprung from the efforts of “our strong and
pious forefathers, in the exercise of a strong and vigorous faith.”66
The Christian religion “was intended by them to be the corner stone
of the social and political structures which they were founding.”67
These “powerful Christian explanations” about the foundations of
republican government reinforced people’s beliefs about America’s
exceptionalism, and before long they became the accepted
narrative.68
A related event coincided with the growth of evangelicalism
and fueled its efforts to sanctify the founding. During the early
nineteenth century, revisionist histories began to appear that
offered hagiographic accounts of the American Revolution, its
leaders, and the drafting of the nation’s governing documents.69
This movement began almost immediately upon the death of
George Washington in 1799, where the first president was not only
venerated but turned into a deific figure.70 This second generation
62. Id. at 213.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 211–19.
65. Id. at 215 (quoting 1 LYMAN BEECHER, BEECHER’S WORKS 189 (1852)).
66. Id. at 217 (quoting JASPER ADAMS, THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO
CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2d ed. 1833)).
67. Id. (quoting ADAMS, supra note 66, at 9).
68. Id. at 215 (quoting JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH:
CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 212 (1990)).
69. See id. at 205–10.
70. See id. at 205.
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of historians set out to glorify the founding and provide
explanations for how the thirteen colonies could defeat the most
powerful nation on earth. Washington became the American Moses
who benefitted from the interposing of God’s providential hand.71
“Divine Providence gave [Washington] opportunities and
dispositions to add great acquired, to the greatest of natural
abilities,” proclaimed Reverend Henry Holcomb; his record of
leadership “was evidence of the disposals of an all superintending
Providence.”72 These same biographers and historians turned the
deist-leaning Washington into an evangelical Christian.73 The
sanctification of Washington then served to sanctify those events
and actions in which he had directly participated, including the
drafting of the Constitution. By the second and third generations,
Washington became “irrevocably linked to the Constitution,”
Catherine Albanese writes, such that his Christian character
infused the document and influenced his fellow drafters to ground
American government on religious principles.74 As religious
historian Robert Baird wrote in 1844: “Most certainly, the
convention which framed the [C]onstitution in 1787, under the
presidency of the immortal Washington, was of neither an infidel
nor atheistical character . . . . All the leading men in it were
believers in Christianity, and Washington, as all the world knows,
was a Christian.”75 This narrative only grew in later years.
Writing two decades later, revisionist historian Benjamin Morris
declared that “[m]ost of the statesmen themselves were Christian
men; and the convention had for its president George Washington,
who everywhere paid a public homage to the Christian religion.”76
Further, “[t]he Christian faith and character of the men who formed
the Constitution forbid the idea that they designed not to place the

71. See id.
72. Id. at 205–06.
73. Id. at 205–10; see HENRY HOLCOMB, A SERMON OCCASIONED BY THE
DEATH OF WASHINGTON (1800), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, supra note 52, at 1397, 1405–06.
74. GREEN, supra note 7, at 209 (quoting CATHERINE L. ALBANESE, SONS OF
THE FATHERS 164-65 (1976)).
75. Id. (quoting ROBERT BAIRD, RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES 259–60
(1844)).
76. B. F. MORRIS, CHRISTIAN LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE CIVIL
INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 249 (1864).
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Constitution and its government under the providence and
protection of God and the principles of the Christian religion.”77 As
a result, Morris concluded, “the Constitution was formed under
Christian influences and is, in its purposes and spirit, a Christian
instrument.”78 By the mid-century, this narrative of the nation’s
Christian origins was firmly embedded in popular literature, school
textbooks, and the public imagination. There it would remain for
much of the century.
II. CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE

The idea that Christian principles underlay and informed the
law predates the early nineteenth century rise of Christian nation
revisionism. This notion originated from two interrelated concepts:
first, that the authority for law is derived from a “higher” or “divine”
law; and second, that Christian principles were incorporated into
the common law.79 Higher law notions (sometimes referred to as
natural law) date back to ancient times (e.g., Cicero) and were
ingrained into the Western legal tradition thanks to medieval
theorists such as Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274).80 Early British
legal writers such as Henry de Bracton (1210–1268) integrated
higher law theory into the emergent common law, which became
more established in the law thanks to later legal writers including
Christopher St. Germain and Sir Edward Coke.81 St. Germain
wrote in the 1530s that the law of England was “based squarely on
the law of God: ‘law eternal is called the first law,’ he wrote, ‘for it
was before all other laws, and all other laws be derived from it.’”82
Coke, Lord Chief Justice under King James I, promoted the “idea
that divine principles underlay the law by writing in Calvin’s Case
(1610) that the ‘law of nature is that which God at the time of
creation of the nature of man infused into his heart (which is also

77. Id.
78. Id. at 248–49.
79. See STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND
STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 149–50 (2010).
80. CORNELIA GREER LEBOUTILLIER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND NATURAL
LAW 59–68 (1950); id. at 150–51.
81. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 151.
82. Id. (quoting CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAIN, THE DOCTOR AND STUDENT 3,
10 (1874)).
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the moral law).’”83 “This natural/higher law, Coke asserted, was
prior and superior to ‘any judicial or municipal law in the world,’
‘immutable,’ and ‘part of the laws of England.’”84 Finally, William
Blackstone also promoted the idea of a preeminent higher law,
writing in his Commentaries that “natural law was ‘dictated by God
himself’ and was ‘of course superior in obligation to any other
[law].’”85 Coke and Blackstone were highly influential for early
American lawyers, with the latter’s Commentaries selling over 1500
copies in the American colonies at the cusp of the American
Revolution.86
The second idea was a variant of higher law theorems: that
Christian doctrines were expressly incorporated into the common
law.87 This maxim arose in part due to the legal status and official
recognition of the Church of England, which, in addition to having
its own ecclesiastical law, received support from the common law.88
Sir Henry Finch’s 1627 treatise, Law or a Discourse Thereof,
popularized the maxim that “Christianity formed part of the
common law by claiming that all types of law (including the
common law) were founded on ‘holy scripture.’”89 British courts
quickly put meaning on the maxim by relying on it to uphold
criminal prosecutions for blasphemy.90 In one famous case, Lord
Matthew Hale asserted that a defendant’s blasphemy “not only
offended God and the Christian religion but also subverted the laws
and government itself.”91 “Christianity is parcel of the laws of
England,” Hale wrote, so “to reproach the Christian Religion is to

83. Id. at 151–52 (quoting Calvin’s Case, 7 Co. 4b, 12a-12b (1610)).
84. Id. at 152 (quoting Calvin’s Case, 7 Co. at 12a-12b).
85. See id. at 153–54 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 40–42 (Stanley N. Katz ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1979)
(1765)).
86. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 88–89 (1973).
87. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 154-55.
88. See Bradley S. Chilton, Cliobernetics, Christianity, and the Common
Law, 83 LAW LIBR. J. 355, 356 (1991).
89. GREEN, supra note 79, at 152; Chilton, supra note 88, at 358, 361–62.
90. Chilton, supra note 88, at 358–59; see GREEN, supra note 79, at 152–
53.
91. GREEN, supra note 79, at 152.
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speak Subversion of the Law.”92 Later blasphemy cases reaffirmed
that principle.93 William Blackstone promoted the maxim too,
asserting that “blasphemy, as well as other offenses against God
and religion, were punishable at common law by fine and
imprisonment because ‘Christianity is part of the laws of
England.’”94
These complimentary notions, embedded in the British legal
tradition by the eighteenth century, became part of the common law
of colonial and early national America. Many early American
lawyers likely considered both notions to be chiefly theoretical
propositions, but a handful of leading jurists promoted both
concepts and argued for their practical applications.95 James
Wilson was a leading member of the Constitutional Convention, a
law professor at the College of Philadelphia, and Associate Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court.96 In his published law lectures, Wilson
asserted that there was a higher law comprised of those “general
and fixed rules” that the “great Creator of all things has
established.”97 Natural law, too, “flow[ed] from the same divine
source . . . the law of God,” though he insisted that municipal law
and the “law of nations—those areas that ‘form[ ] the objects of the
profession of law’—were governed chiefly by reason, conscience, and
custom.”98 Going a step farther than Wilson, “Maryland law
professor David Hoffman wrote in 1823 that even municipal law
had its ‘deep foundations in the universal laws of our moral nature,

92. Id. (quoting Rex v. Taylor, 1 Vent. 293; 3 Keble 607, 621 (1676)); see
LEONARD W. LEVY, TREASON AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE OF
BLASPHEMY 313–14 (1981). Taylor reputedly declared Christ to be a “whoremaster” and a “bastard” and religion to be a “cheat.” Id. at 418 n.9 (quoting
Taylor, 3 Keble at 621). Taylor also claimed to be the younger brother of Jesus.
Id. In another blasphemy case 53 year later, Chief Justice Raymond would
write that “Christianity in general is parcel of the common law of England and
therefore to be protected by it.” Rex v. Woolston, 2 Strange’s Rpts., 832, 834; 1
Barn. 162 (K.B. 1729); 94 Eng. Rep. 112.
93. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 152–53.
94. Id. at 153 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (Charles M. Harr ed., Beacon Press 1962) (1765–1769)).
95. See id. at 155–56.
96. Id. at 156.
97. Id. (quoting 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 123–26
(Robert G. McClosky ed., 1967)).
98. Id. (quoting WILSON, supra note 97, at 123–26).
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and, all its positive enactments, proceeding on these, must receive
their just interpretation with a reference to them.’”99 “Hoffman
identified the Bible as the first and preeminent foundation of the
law: it was ‘the foundation of the common law in every [C]hristian
nation. . . . There is much law in it.’”100 As a result, “‘[t]he
[C]hristian religion is a part of the law of the land,’ Hoffman
asserted, and ‘should certainly receive no inconsiderable portion of
the lawyer’s attention.’”101
The two most notable proponents of a higher law theorem and
for the incorporation of Christian principles into American law were
New York Chancellor James Kent and United States Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Story. “Both Kent and Story had trained on
Coke and Blackstone and had a deep affection for the common
law,”102 and their writings were highly influential on generations
of American lawyers.103 In his influential Commentaries on
American Law, Kent sprinkled higher law concepts liberally
throughout its discussions.104 Kent asserted that positive law could
not be separated entirely from “natural jurisprudence . . . from
which the science of morality is deduced.”105 The law of nations,
Kent continued, “so far as it is founded on the principles of natural
law, is equally binding in every age, and upon all mankind.”106 But
“the Christian nations” were governed by “a brighter light, [with]
more certain truths . . . which Christianity has communicated to
the ethical jurisprudence of the ancients, hav[ing] established a law
of nations peculiar to themselves.”107

99. Id. at 157 (1 DAVID HOFFMAN, A LECTURE, INTRODUCTORY TO A COURSE
64–66 (1823)).
100. Id. (quoting HOFFMAN, supra note 99, at 64–66).
101. Id. (quoting HOFFMAN, supra note 99, at 64–66).
102. Id.
103. See generally Symposium, The Influence of Story and Kent on the Development of the Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 221 (1973).
104. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 157.
105. See id. at 157–58 (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 2–3 (Little, Brown & Co. 13th ed. 1884) (1826)).
106. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 4 (O.W. Holmes, Jr.
ed., Little, Brown & Co. 12th ed. 1878) (1826).
107. Id.; GREEN, supra note 79, at 419 n.26 (quoting KENT, supra note 106,
at 2–4).
OF LEGAL STUDY
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Story, a close friend of Kent, also emphasized a higher law
source to natural law in several of his speeches and writings.108
“Story stressed that natural law lay ‘at the foundation of all other
laws’” and was a requisite “for understanding of all aspects of
jurisprudence, especially constitutional law and the common
law.”109 For Story, natural law had an unmistakable theistic
quality:
The obligatory force of the law of nature upon man is derived from its presumed coincidence with the will of the
Creator. God has fashioned man according to his own
pleasures, and has fixed the laws of his being . . . . He has
the supreme right to prescribe the rules, to which man
shall regulate his conduct, and the means, by which he
shall obtain happiness and avoid misery.110
Story asserted that “as [God] is our Lawgiver and Judge, we
owe an unreserved obedience to his commands.”111 This fealty was
equally required of public officials: “[a]ll magistrates are
responsible to God for the due and honest discharge of their
duty.”112
Story’s and Kent’s acceptance of a higher basis for the law led
them to embrace the maxim that Christian principles were
incorporated into the law itself. Story wrote about the maxim more
frequently than Kent, though the latter famously put the maxim
into practice. In 1829, Story delivered his inaugural address as the
Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.113 Five years
earlier, a letter of Thomas Jefferson’s had been publicized where
the former president had decried the idea of the law’s incorporation
of Christianity as a “judiciary forgery,” based on “a conspiracy . . .
between Church and State.”114 Upon hearing about Jefferson’s
108. GREEN, supra note 79, at 158.
109. Id. (quoting JOSEPH STORY, The Value and Importance of Legal Study
(Aug. 25, 1829), in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 503, 533 (William W. Story ed., 1852)).
110. Id. (quoting Joseph Story, Natural Law, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 150, 150 (Francis Leiber ed., 1836)).
111. Id. (quoting Story, supra note 110, at 151).
112. Id. (quoting Story, supra note 110, at 158).
113. STORY, supra note 109, at 503.
114. GREEN, supra note 79, at 193 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42,
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letter, Story wrote a friend that “[i]t appears to me inconceivable
how any man can doubt, that Christianity is part of the Common
Law of England.”115 But Story waited until Jefferson’s death to
attack him publicly, which he did in his Harvard lecture:
One of the most beautiful boasts of our municipal
jurisprudence is, that Christianity is a part of the common
law, from which it seeks to sanction its rights, and by which
it endeavors to regulate its doctrines.
And
notwithstanding the specious objection of one of our
distinguished statesmen, the boast is as true as it is
beautiful. There has never been a period in which the
common law did not recognize Christianity as lying at its
foundations.116
For Story, this meant that the United States was “a part of the
Christian community of nations,” which acquired their authority
for their “policy of laws” through their consistency with Christian
precepts.117 Story followed up on his brief retort to Jefferson with
a more comprehensive rebuttal in an 1833 article in The American
Jurist titled Christianity a Part of the Common Law.118 Story
refuted Jefferson’s historical analysis (calling it “novel”) with an
extensive review of British authority that had affirmed the
maxim.119 He noted several areas of the law—domestic, behavioral,
criminal—that drew on Christian values for their meaning.120 “But
50–51 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Allery Bergh eds., 1903)). Jefferson had
long held similar sentiments, writing in an earlier essay in the appendix to his
Reports of Cases Determined in the General Court of Virginia of “judicial forgery” underpinned by an “alliance between church and state in England [which
had] made their judges accomplices in the frauds of the clergy.” 1 THOMAS
JEFFERSON, Whether Christianity is Part of the Common Law? (1764), reprinted
in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 360, 360 n.1, 367 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1892). Jefferson’s citation of Blackstone’s Commentaries, published in
1769, however, makes 1764 too early for the essay’s publication. GREEN, supra
note 79, at 424 n.65.
115. Letter from Joseph Story to Edward Everett (Sept. 15, 1824), in LIFE
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, 429, 429–30 (Williams W. Story ed., 1851).
116. STORY, supra note 109, at 517.
117. Id. at 534–35.
118. See Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common Law, 9 AM. JURIST
& L. MAG. 346, 346–48 (1833).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 347.
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independently of any weight in any of these authorities,” Story
declared, “can any man seriously doubt, that Christianity is
recognized as true, as a revelation, by the law of England, that is,
by the common law?”121
Story demonstrated the practical application of the maxim in
an 1827 decision while riding circuit as a trial judge. During one
trial, the defendant’s counsel moved to exclude the testimony of two
witnesses on the ground they were Universalists and did not believe
in God or in a future state of punishments and rewards, which
rendered them unable to swear an oath.122 Story agreed, ruling
that the witnesses’ lack of religious belief rendered them
incompetent to testify.123 “Persons who do not believe in the
existence of God or a future state, or have no religious belief, are
not entitled to be sworn as witnesses,” Story wrote, applying the
traditional common law rule.124 Although Story did not elaborate
on the basis for his holding, he noted in his Harvard speech that a
religious prerequisite for swearing an oath was one example of how
the law incorporated Christian principles.125
Another case in which the maxim came up was the famous 1844
case of Vidal v. Girard’s Executor, involving a two-million-dollar
bequest to establish a college in Philadelphia, but only on the
condition that the institution be nonsectarian in the sense that no
religious tenets be taught.126 Daniel Webster represented those
relatives of the testator who sought to have the gift nullified as
“derogatory to the Christian religion.”127 Before the Supreme
Court, Webster argued that the bequest was void because it
conflicted with the principle that Christianity was part of the
law.128 Because “Christian religion, its general principles, must
ever be regarded among us as the foundation of civil society,”
121. Id. at 348 (emphasis in original).
122. Wakefield v. Ross, 28 F. Cas. 1346, 1347 n.2 (Story, Circuit Justice,
D.R.I. 1827).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. STORY, supra note 109, at 517.
126. Vidal v. Girard’s Executor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 130, 133 (1844).
127. DANIEL WEBSTER, The Christian Ministry and the Religious Instruction of the Young (Feb. 20, 1844), in THE SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL
WEBSTER 505, 505, 508 (Edwin P. Whipple ed., 1906).
128. Id. at 508–30.
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Webster argued, “the preservation of Christianity is one of the great
and leading ends of government.”129 Webster cited to areas of the
law such as prohibitions on blasphemy and Sunday labor to
demonstrate how the law reinforced Christianity.130 All of these
examples, Webster insisted, “proclaim that Christianity, general,
tolerant Christianity . . . is the law of the land.”131 Webster’s
argument was no doubt directed at Justice Story, who told his wife
that “the whole discussion ha[d] assumed a semi-theological
character.”132
Writing the opinion in Vidal for the Court, Story upheld the
bequest, reading the will’s language narrowly so as to prohibit
sectarian instruction only, such that lay teachers could still instruct
in “the general principles of Christianity.”133 Meeting Webster’s
argument half-way, Story declared:
[W]e are compelled to admit that although Christianity be
a part of the common law of the state, yet it is so in this
qualified sense, that its divine origin and truth are
admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and
openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance
of believers or the injury of the public.134
Story did not address Webster’s claims that Christianity served as
the foundation for government other than calling the United States
a “Christian country;” rather, he simply noted that the justices were
satisfied that “there is nothing in the devise establishing a college
. . . which [is] inconsistent with the Christian religion.”135
Although Story read the language of the bequest generously, his
opinion suggested that a clearer irreligious bequest might still be
struck down as being “inconsistent with the Christian religion.”136
In contrast to Story’s subtle affirmation of the Christian nation
maxim was an 1811 opinion written by James Kent while he served
129. Id. at 525, 529.
130. Id. at 529.
131. Id. at 530.
132. Letter from Joseph Story to Sarah Waldo Story (Feb. 7, 1844), in 2 LIFE
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 467, 468 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
133. Vidal v. Girard’s Executor, 43 U.S. 127, 200 (1844).
134. Id. at 198.
135. Id. at 198, 201.
136. Id. at 201.
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as Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court.137 In People v.
Ruggles the defendant was convicted of “wickedly, maliciously, and
blasphemously” uttering false and scandalous words that “Jesus
Christ was a bastard, and his mother must be a whore.”138 The
defendant appealed on the ground that New York did not have a
statute criminalizing blasphemy and that his conviction conflicted
with the state constitution’s guarantee of freedom of conscience.139
Brushing aside Ruggles’ sound arguments, Kent upheld the
conviction on the ground that Christianity was part of the state’s
common law: “Christianity, in its enlarged sense, as a religion
revealed and taught in the Bible, is not unknown to our law.”140
Kent did more than simply affirm that the law recognized and
reinforced certain Christian principles by declaring the nation’s
dependence on Christianity. Christian discipline and virtue,
“which help to bind society together,” were essential interests of
civil government, Kent wrote, and “whatever strikes at the root of
[C]hristianity, tends manifestly to the dissolution of civil
government.”141 Here, Kent conflated the ideas of the law’s
recognition of Christianity with Christianity serving as a
foundational principle for government. Referencing New York,
Kent declared that the framers of the state constitution “never
meant to withdraw religion in general, and with it the best
sanctions of moral and social obligation from all consideration and
notice of law.”142 On the contrary, he noted, the law “assumes that
we are a [C]hristian people, and the morality of the country is
deeply ingrafted upon Christianity.”143
People v. Ruggles was a seminal case for the propositions that
Christianity served as a foundation of republican government and
that the law in turn enforced certain Christian principles. It was
cited throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century and

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 292–93 (N.Y. 1811).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 295–97.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 293–94.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 295.
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served as precedent for other legal areas where judges affirmed the
authority of Christianity in the law and civil government.144
A. Blasphemy
Blasphemy was usually a common law offense, a carry-over
from the time of religious establishments when civil courts would
enforce crimes against the official church. Without an established
church in the United States, judges justified blasphemy
prosecutions for the effect on society writ large, insisting that
blasphemy tended to “corrupt the morals of the people[ ] and to
destroy good order.”145 Despite that rationale, the offense did not
require evidence that anyone was corrupted or that the words
actually disturbed the peace or interfered with religious worship;
instead, it operated on an assumption of a Christian foundation for
morals and public order and of the law’s obligation to protect and
promote Christian principles.146
No more than a handful of blasphemy prosecutions were
reported during the nineteenth century, with the last significant
case occurring in 1837.147 In each case, prosecutors relied on some
formulation of the Christian nation maxim.148
Three reported appeals of blasphemy convictions are
particularly notable for the way the judges employed the Christian
nation maxim to uphold the convictions. In one case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that the defendant’s
assertion that “the Holy Scriptures were a mere fable,” made in a
private debating society, revealed a “malicious intention” to “vilify
the Christian religion” and were punishable.149 Further, it posited
that “[n]o free government now exists in the world, unless where

144. See Note, Blasphemy, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 694, 702-10 (1970).
145. Id. at 694.
146. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 162–69, 174–78; LEVY, supra note 92,
400–23; Note, supra note 144, at 694–723.
147. See Note, supra note 144, at 696, 702-10. Blasphemy was a minor
behavioral offense, so most prosecutions occurred in a municipal or justice of
the peace court and were never reported or appealed. See LEVY, supra note 92,
at 400–01. It is impossible to know the true number of cases. Id.
148. See Note, supra note 144, at 702–10.
149. Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 398–99 (Pa.
1824).
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Christianity is acknowledged, and is the religion of the country.”150
Christianity was “the only stable support of all human laws.”151
Similar ill-affection toward Christianity was present in the other
two cases: the blasphemous statements represented a “malicious
and wanton attack on the [C]hristian religion”152 and a desire “to
destroy the veneration due to [God].”153 In all instances, there was
no evidence that the defendants’ utterances had disturbed the
peace; they had simply struck at Christianity, which was “the
preserver of the peace and good order of society.”154 The role that
Christianity played was not simply persuasive but was “said to be
the foundation of all human laws,” declared the Delaware Supreme
Court; “without this religion no nation has ever yet continued
free.”155 Blasphemy prosecutions declined in mid-century, evolving
into civil offenses such as profane swearing and disorderly conduct,
which required evidence of an actual public disturbance.156 During
their reign, however, blasphemy decisions represented one of the
clearer applications of the Christian nation maxim in American
law.
B. Sunday Laws
The idea that Christianity served as a foundation for the law
and government found application in other areas of the law
including Sunday law enforcement, oath requirements, probate
law, and domestic law.157 At times, reliance on the maxim was
subtle without an express affirmation of the principle; in other
instances, the presence of the maxim was more pronounced.
Because of the historical connection between Christianity and
Sunday observance, enforcement of laws prohibiting work,
transportation, and entertainment on Sundays was a prime vehicle
150. Id. at 406.
151. Id. at 407.
152. State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553, 555 (Gen. Sess. 1837).
153. Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206, 220 (1838). For
a detailed account of Kneeland, see The Trial of Abner Kneeland, in 13
AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 450–575 (John D. Lawson, ed., 1921).
154. Chandler, 2 Del. at 563.
155. Chandler, 2 Del. at 557–58, 560.
156. See Green, supra note 79, at 239.
157. See generally Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 27 (1998).
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for affirming the nation’s Christian character. For at least the first
half of the nineteenth century, judges readily acknowledged the
religious functions of Sunday laws, chiefly to promote public piety
and to demonstrate a collective societal respect for the Lord’s Day.
As the Alabama Supreme Court wrote almost casually in 1843,
“[w]e do not think the design of the legislature in the passage of the
act can be doubted. It was evidently to promote and advance the
interest of religion, by prohibiting all persons from engaging in
their common and ordinary avocations of business, or employment,
on Sunday.”158 Enforcement of Sunday or “Sabbath” laws varied
widely, but when enforced, their sanctions came down particularly
hard on religious minorities—Jews, Seventh Day Baptists, and
Seventh-day Adventists—often in the form of hefty fines and
imprisonment.159 As with blasphemy, prosecutors initially faced no
obligation to show that the Sabbath violation disturbed other’s
religious worship or caused a public annoyance; rather, actions
deemed inconsistent with the Sabbath were considered
“constructively a breach of the peace” because of their affront to the
Lord’s Day and their tendency to create a bad example.160
By acknowledging the religious function of Sunday laws, judges
implicitly affirmed the relationship between the law and
Christianity; in several cases, however, judges candidly
acknowledged that connection. In an 1834 case, the Maryland
Court of Appeals declared that “[t]he Sabbath is emphatically the
day of rest, and the day of rest here is the ‘Lord’s day’ or
[C]hristian’s Sunday.”161 Maryland was “a [C]hristian community,
and a day set apart as the day of rest, is the day consecrated by the
resurrection of our Saviour.”162 “Sunday or the Sabbath is properly
and emphatically called the Lord’s day,” concurred the Arkansas
Supreme Court in 1850, “and is one amongst the first and most
sacred institutions of the [C]hristian religion. This system of
religion is recognized as constituting part and parcel of the common

158. O’Donnell v. Sweeney, 5 Ala. 467, 469 (1843).
159. See KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 37–68 (2014).
160. Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 347 (1816) (emphasis in original).
161. Kilgour v. Miles, 6 Gill & Johns. 268, 274 (Md. 1834) (emphasis in original).
162. Id.
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law, and as such all of the institutions growing out of it . . . .”163
And a New York trial court asserted in 1861 that the “stability of
government, [and] the welfare of the subject and interests of
society” required “that the day of rest observed by the people of the
nation should be uniform, and that its observance should be to some
extent compulsory.”164 Not only were Sabbath laws proof of the
law’s relationship to Christianity, the religion they protected
constituted the linchpin that held together republican society.
One notable Sunday law decision was the 1846 case of City
Council of Charleston v. Benjamin.165 The defendant, a Jewish
merchant, was fined forty dollars for opening his store on Sunday,
and he requested a bench trial.166 Benjamin received a surprising
decision from the judge who dismissed the fine, writing that the law
could not stand in “a community where there is complete severance
between Church and State, and where entire freedom of religious
faith and worship is guaranteed to all its citizens alike.”167 The
prosecutor appealed that holding, arguing that “[C]hristianity is a
part of the common law” and that it served as “the foundation of
those morals and manners upon which our society is formed.”168
The appeal presented the South Carolina Supreme Court with a
clear choice between two competing values: church-state separation
or America’s Christian nationhood. Not surprisingly, the high court
chose the latter principle.169 The court initially affirmed the
religious basis for Sunday laws, stating that they properly
reminded people of “the Resurrection” and “the first visible triumph
over death, hell, and the grave!”170 Indulging majoritarian
tendencies, the court emphasized, “[o]n that day we rest, and to us
it is the Sabbath of the Lord¾its decent observance, in a Christiancommunity, is that which ought to be expected.”171 Sunday

163.
164.
165.
(1848).
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259, 263 (1850).
Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548, 568 (N.Y. 1861).
City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 509
Id.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id.
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observance was not just a moral obligation; its legal enforcement
was justified because “the Christian religious is part of the common
law of South Carolina!”172 The court declared that Christianity’s
influences extended beyond the law into “the foundation of even the
Article of the Constitution under consideration.”173 In fact, the
court continued, “[i]t was Christianity robed in light, and
descending as the dove upon our ancestors,” that inspired them to
create a government based on liberty.174 Courts would continue to
affirm a religious basis for Sunday laws throughout the remainder
of the century, although those rationales were gradually replaced
with justifications based on health and public welfare rationales.175
C. Oaths
The Christian nation maxim also impacted judicial
determinations of the necessity and substance of oath requirements
for participating in legal proceedings. The traditional common law
rule was that for a witness, juror, or declarant to be competent to
testify or undertake a legal obligation, he had to assert a belief not
only in God but also in the accountability of his soul after death for
swearing falsely.176 When rigorously enforced, this rule excluded
Jews, Universalists, skeptics, and sometimes Catholics from
undertaking important legal functions.177 Early antebellum judges
regularly affirmed the connection between the oath requirement

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 522.
175. The transition to secular justifications for Sunday laws began in midcentury. In 1849, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld that state’s Sabbath law,
prohibiting acts deemed contrary to the “common and religious observance of
the day,” but only over a vigorous dissent. Sellers v. Dugan, 18 Ohio 489, 490
(1849). Four years later the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court changed
course, insisting that Sunday was merely a civil day of rest from labor. Bloom
v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 388, 390 (1853). The court expressly disavowed that
Christianity formed a part of the law in Ohio: “it follows that neither [C]hristianity, nor any other system of religion, is part of the law of the state.” Id.
The court averred, “[w]e have no union of church and state, nor has our government ever been vested with authority to enforce any religious observance,
simply because it is religious.” Id. at 387. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 231-47.
176. D. X. JUNKIN, THE OATH: A DIVINE ORDINANCE, AND AN ELEMENT OF THE
SOCIAL CONSTITUTION 1 (1845).
177. Id. at 72, 186–87.
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and the law’s Christian basis, often extending that connection to
reinforce notions of the nation’s religious foundations.178 In the
1820 case of Jackson v. Gridley, the New York Supreme Court held
that a Universalist could not be sworn as a witness because he
lacked an orthodox belief in God and in a future state of
punishments and rewards.179 Repeating the traditional rule, the
court held that testimony was not competent or admissible, “unless
delivered under the solemnity of an oath, which comes home to the
conscience of the witness, and will create a tie arising from his belief
that false swearing would expose him to punishment in the life to
come.”180 In the court’s mind, the rule did more than merely ensure
the trustworthiness of oral testimony.181 The oath, with its appeal
to God, sanctified the legal process: “[o]n this great principle rest
all our institutions, and especially the distribution of justice
between man and man.”182 To abolish the oath’s religious
requirements, wrote another judge, would undermine the entire
judicial system because there would be no “tie upon his conscience,
and of course, that sanction which the law requires.”183 Arguments
that the oath requirement violated principles of religious freedom
and equality failed because “Christianity is a part of the common
law of the land.”184 The oath, therefore, continually reaffirmed the
religious foundations of the law and of God’s ultimate authority
over matters of truth.185
Religious justifications for behavioral laws dropped off as the
nineteenth century progressed. This was due to a growing religious
diversity, expanding notions of religious toleration, and the

178. Id. at 219.
179. Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 103 (N.Y. 1820).
180. Id. at 106.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66, 73–74 (1828).
184. Id. at 76.
185. As with the transition that occurred with Sunday law justifications, as
the nineteenth century progressed, judges slowly liberalized the oath requirements, first removing the necessity of affirming a belief in a future state of
rewards and punishments, and then transitioning to allowing declarants to
swear to a religious obligation to tell the truth. See GREEN, supra note 79, at
214–18.
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professionalization of the legal profession.186 As the law was called
on to respond and adapt to new developments, such as
industrialization and corporations, an emphasis on the moral
quality of the law gave way to more practicable virtues of
Statutes, with their set
adaptability and predictability.187
remedies, came to replace the common law with its moral quality.
Over time, the institution of the law became amoral.188
D. Treatise Writers
This evolving “secularization” of the law did not forestall
popular claims about the religious foundations for law and
government; in fact, fears about the secularization of society may
have fueled such claims in reaction to this perceived shift. During
the second half of the nineteenth century, a new generation of
writers picked up on the narrative promoted by Robert Baird and
Benjamin Morris.189 Some of the Christian nation claims were
pronounced, while others were more subtle. Writing near the end
of the century, Presbyterian minister, Isaac A. Cornelison,
responded to the perceived secularizing trend in the culture and to
efforts “towards a still further restriction of the religious function
of civil government.”190 It was a “well-established fact,” Cornelison
wrote, that “the civil institutions of this country are necessarily,
rightfully, and lawfully Christian.”191 This was demonstrated by
the religious inclinations of the Founders and their efforts to
incorporate Christian principles into the operations of
government.192 Thus, the trend, “which requires the removal of
every vestige of Christian basis, motive, and purpose from its laws,
is unwarranted.”193 Cornelison called for renewed enforcement of
Sunday laws and even a revival of blasphemy prosecutions: “[t]he
186. Id. at 214, 216.
187. Id. at 207 (citing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 1, 4 (1977)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 102-03.
190. ISAAC C. CORNELISON, THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO CIVIL
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 175–76 (1895).
191. Id. at 164.
192. Id. at 372.
193. Id. at 308–09.
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government possesses a positively religious character; it is
Christian,” Cornelison asserted, “and to modify its regulation of a
Christian observance in accommodation to the views of the
irreligious or the anti-Christian” would invite anarchy.194
Sounding an ominous warning, Cornelison insisted that “[i]f the
government is Christian, the anti-Christian must be regarded as in
that respect an enemy” of the nation.195
Taking a less threatening tone were treatises by church
historians Philip Schaff and Sanford H. Cobb. Building on the
hagiographic accounts of the founding period, Schaff asserted that
“the framers of the Constitution were, without exception, believers
in God and in future rewards and punishments . . . . All recognized
the hand of Divine Providence in leading them through the war of
independence.”196 As a result, Schaff remarked, the Constitution
“is Christian in substance, though not in form. It is pervaded by
the spirit of justice and humanity, which are Christian. The First
Amendment could not have originated in any pagan or
Mohammedan country, but presupposes Christian civilization and
culture.”197 Sanford Cobb agreed with Schaff’s account, insisting
the argument that “the American constitutions are unchristian. . . .
is specious, appealing only to a superficial religious sentiment.”198
Documenting the various religious affirmations contained in state
constitutions, official proclamations, and behavioral laws, Cobb
concluded that from “the constant resort in legislation and
judicature to religious and Christian principles—we may safely
declare that, if the American people be not a Christian nation, there
is none upon the earth.”199
Legal treatise writers during the latter-half of the nineteenth
century were generally more restrained, though many repeated
modified claims that the law incorporated Christian principles.
This was due in no small part to the long shadow cast by Joseph
Story’s writings, which later legal writers continued to cite as
194. Id. at 373–74.
195. Id. at 374.
196. PHILIP SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (New
York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1888).
197. Id. at 40.
198. SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 524
(New York, Cooper Square Pub., 1902).
199. Id. at 525.
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authority. As a result, in his influential Constitutional Limitations,
Thomas Cooley wrote that “[i]t is frequently said that Christianity
is a part of the law of the land. In a certain sense and for certain
purposes this is true.”200 Yet, he did not relate how laws concerning
“family and social relations” and public behavior relied on Christian
precepts.201 Cooley also asserted that there was nothing in the
Constitution that prohibited official acknowledgements of God or
officials from “recognizing a superintending Providence” behind the
nation’s founding: “the notorious fact [was] that the prevailing
religion in the States is Christian.”202 Henry Campbell Black’s
Handbook of American Constitutional Law offered a similarly
measured account of the maxim.203 Citing to Story, Black wrote
that the “statement that Christianity is part of the law of the land
must be taken in a qualified and limited sense.”204 But whatever
those limitations, Black maintained that “many of our best civil and
social institutions, and the most important to be preserved in a free
and civilized state, are founded upon the Christian religion.”205 As
a result, Black felt comfortable asserting that “the whole purpose
and policy of the law assume[s] that we are a nation of Christians,
and while toleration is the principle in religious matters, the laws
are to recognize the existence of that system of faith, and our
institutions are to be based on that assumption.”206
Despite promoting a moderate form of the maxim, the law
writers’ endorsement of the Christian foundations for law and
government had the effect of validating the concept for later
generations while fostering the idea of Christian privilege within
the law with non-Christians merely being tolerated.
More
important, both the legal and popular religious authors asserted
that there was no inconsistency between the Christian nation
maxim and the Constitution’s provisions regarding religious free
200. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
670 (7th ed. 1903).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 669.
203. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 390 (1895).
204. Id. (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 1877, 1879 (1833)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 391.
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exercise, non-establishment, and no religious tests. In reconciling
these seemingly contradictory principles, these authors effectively
made the latter subject to the former and limited the scope and
understanding of non-establishment and religious equality.
E. The “Christian Nation” Decision
One final nineteenth-century acknowledgement of America’s
Christian nationhood is worth noting, if for no other reason than it
came from the United States Supreme Court. In 1892, the Supreme
Court heard a case brought by a prominent New York City
Episcopal church after it was fined for hiring a foreign minister in
violation of an immigration law.207 Holy Trinity Church v. United
States called upon the justices to rule whether the anti-foreign
recruitment provision of the immigration law applied to entities
such as churches.208 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice David
J. Brewer held that Congress had not intended the hiring
restriction to apply to “ministers of the gospel or, indeed any class
whose toil is of the brain.”209 Instead, wrote Brewer, Congress
meant the statute to apply “only to the work of the manual laborer,
as distinguished from that of the professional man.”210 Rather than
ending his opinion there, Brewer offered a second reason for
reversing the fine.211 According to Brewer, America was a
“Christian nation” that had been founded by religious people who
had formed a government based on religious principles.212 The
nation’s laws and charters recognized the importance of
Christianity and accommodated its practice.213 As support for his
statement that America was a Christian nation Brewer quoted
extensively from colonial charters and early state constitutions that
acknowledged God’s authority over human action or that favored
Christianity.214 Brewer also referred to several state cases where

207. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892).
208. Id.; see Steven K. Green, Justice David Josiah Brewer and the “Christian Nation” Maxim, 63 ALB. L. REV. 427, 444–45 (1999).
209. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 463.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 465–66.
212. Id. at 470–71.
213. Id. at 465–67.
214. Id.
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judges had declared Christianity to be part of the common law.215
Finally, he noted the prevalence of Christian institutions and of
how Christianity informed various customs.216 For Brewer, all of
this evidence led to one conclusion:
These, and many other matters which might be noticed,
add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of
organic utterances that this is a Christian nation. In the
face of all these, shall it be believed that a congress of the
United States intended to make it a misdemeanor for a
church of this country to contract for the services of a
Christian minister residing in another nation?217
The Court’s “Christian Nation” decision, as it became known,
did not go unnoticed. Religious conservatives cited to it as authority
in attempts to prevent the Chicago Columbian Exposition from
opening on Sundays, and the opinion fueled a drive for a proposed
constitutional amendment to insert an acknowledgement of God in
the Preamble.218 Brewer, a moderate evangelical, was proud of his
opinion, and for the next eighteen years of his life he spoke and
wrote about the subject with enthusiasm.219 Through two works in
particular, American Citizenship (1902) and The United States A
Christian Nation (1905), both of which were based on a series of
college lectures, Brewer elaborated on the themes raised in Holy
Trinity:220 “[C]hristianity has entered into and become part of the
life of this republic,” Brewer maintained, such that “the principles
of [C]hristianity [serve as] the foundations of our social and political
life.”221 Brewer understood the meaning of the maxim in several
ways. The first was historical, that many American colonies were
founded by devoutly religious people who sought to establish
America’s
communities based on Christian principles.222
215. Id. at 470.
216. Id. at 471.
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. Green, supra note 208, at 463–66.
219. See id. at 448–50.
220. See generally DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN
NATION (1905) [hereinafter A CHRISTIAN NATION]; DAVID J. BREWER, AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP (1902) [hereinafter AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP].
221. AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, supra note 220, at 20.
222. Green, supra note 208, at 448–49.
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“beginnings were in a marked and marvelous degree identified with
Christianity.”223 Brewer also believed America was Christian in a
cultural-demographic sense and that Christian traditions and
beliefs influenced daily customs and practices.224 In addition, he
posited that America’s Christian culture represented the highest
form of civilization.225 Like many of his contemporaries, Brewer’s
assertion went hand-in-hand with a belief in the superiority of
Anglo-American culture. “The most thoroughly Christian nation is
the most civilized,” he claimed.226 Finally, Brewer believed that
Christian values informed the law and the nation’s public
institutions: “I could show how largely our laws and customs are
based upon the laws of Moses and the teachings of Christ,” he
wrote.227 Yet, Brewer saw that proposition as having limited
application: “I do not mean that as a nation we should have a state
religion, or that by secular means we support any form of
Christianity.”228 Brewer strongly believed that two attributes of a
Christian nation were a respect for religious liberty and the
existence of separation of church and state.229 Religious liberty—
the right to believe and practice the religion of one’s choice—was at
the heart of the freedoms epitomized by a Christian nation: “[E]ach
[person] stands alone with his conscience,” Brewer maintained.230
He continued, “[n]o one is in duty bound as a citizen to attend a
particular church service, or indeed any church service. The
freedom of conscience, the liberty of the individual, gives to every
individual the right to stay away.”231 Brewer also understood the
maxim to be consistent with church-state separation:

223. A CHRISTIAN NATION, supra note 220, at 13; see AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP,
supra note 220, at 21–22.
224. Green, supra note 208, at 450.
225. See A CHRISTIAN NATION, supra note 220, at 65.
226. See id.; Green, supra note 208, at 452.
227. See A CHRISTIAN NATION, supra note 220, at 39.
228. Green, supra note 208, at 448–49 (quoting David J. Brewer, A Plea for
the Bible, RAM’S HORN, Sept. 10, 1904, at 27).
229. Id. at 458.
230. AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, supra note 220, at 22; Green, supra note 208,
at 458.
231. A CHRISTIAN NATION, supra note 220, at 54; Green, supra note 208, at
448.

2021]

IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION?

465

We have no state church, and the settled rule in this
country is of entire separation between state and church,
and yet that separation is not so complete that the state is
indifferent to the welfare and prosperity of the church.
This is a Christian commonwealth. We believe that the
best interests of both are promoted by enforcing entire
separation between the state and the church . . . .232
Brewer thus offered a nuanced understanding of what it meant
to say that America was a Christian nation. In no place did he
suggest the maxim should be used to enforce Christian mores on
unwilling people or to marginalize religious minorities.
Unfortunately, most commentators at the time and since have not
explored Brewer’s detailed meaning.233 For religious conservatives
in particular, the Holy Trinity opinion was confirmation from no
less an authority than the Supreme Court that America was and
remained a Christian nation;234 the American Sabbath Union
effused that “this important decision rests upon the fundamental
principle that religion is imbedded in the organic structure of the
American government” and “establishes clearly the fact that our
Government is Christian.”235
As a legal holding, Brewer’s
statements in Holy Trinity have not withstood the test of time, with
later justices calling the decision an “aberration”236 and his
declaration “arrogant[ ]” and a “long step backward.” 237 Yet, his
Christian nation declaration has lived on in popular religious
literature, adding authority to claims of America’s Christian

232. Comm’rs of Wyandotte Cty. v. First Presbyterian Church of Wyandotte, 1 P. 109, 112 (Kan. 1883).
233. Green, supra note 208, at 430.
234. Id. at 462–68; see also CORNELISON, supra note 190, at 144–47 (noting
the Court’s affirmation of Christianity as part of the public life and customs of
the United States).
235. Green, supra note 208, at 463, 463 n.268 (quoting THE PEARL OF DAYS,
May 7, 1892 reprinted in WILLIAM ADDISON BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS
BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION, at 508 n.1 (William Allen Colcord ed., Da
Capo Press rev. and enlarged ed. 1970) (1891)).
236. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717–18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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nationhood.
regularly.238

Modern Christian nation proponents quote it
III. MODERN APPLICATIONS

By the early twentieth century, the maxim that America was a
Christian nation had lost most of its resiliency. Several factors
contributed to this change. Within legal philosophy, the popularity
of natural law had declined, supplanted by amoral schools of legal
positivism and legal realism.239 Law was based on human will, and
nothing more.240 Culturally, American Protestantism splintered
into followers of the Social Gospel, Modernism, mainstream
Evangelicalism, and Fundamentalism,241 with the first two
factions questioning claims of the nation’s “chosen” status and of a
special relationship between Christianity and democratic
government.242 In contrast, Fundamentalism, with its pessimistic
pre-millennial eschatology, saw itself at odds with what it perceived
to be a sinful culture that was nonredeemable.243 The horrors of
World War I also destroyed the earlier Protestant sense of an
optimistic Christian America exceptionalism.244 Finally, the early
1900s witnessed the rise of the ecumenical interfaith movement
that promoted religious pluralism and a national identity in terms
of a broadly conceived Judeo-Christian culture.245 All of these

238. See, e.g., MYTH OF SEPARATION, supra note 27, at 83; DEMAR, supra note
16, at 11–13.
239. See generally Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915 (2005) (examining the strengths and weaknesses
of legal realist theory and noting its rejection of the connection between law
and morality present in natural law theory); Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Three
Antinomies of Modern Legal Positivism and Their Resolution in Christian Legal Thought, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 53 (2005) (discussing the history and philosophy of legal positivism and natural law, as expressed by Catholic leaders,
and examining the tensions between the two).
240. See Green, supra note 239, at 1927-36.
241. See ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN AMERICA 1880–1920 126-36, 139-52 (2016).
242. See id. at 98–112.
243. See MATTHEW AVERY SUTTON, AMERICAN APOCALYPSE: A HISTORY OF
MODERN EVANGELICALISM 79-113 (2014).
244. See HANDY, supra note 241, at 186.
245. See id. at 178–82, 187–89; see also K. HEALAN GASTON, IMAGINING
JUDEO-CHRISTIAN AMERICA: RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND THE REDEFINITION OF
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occurrences were at odds with claims of America’s Christian
nationhood, which lost favor within polite society.
Exceptions existed.
Woodrow Wilson, likely the most
religiously devout president until Jimmy Carter, famously declared
that “America was born a Christian nation. America was born to
exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are
derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture.”246 Similarly, a
noticeable strain of Christian nationalism appeared with the rise of
post-war nationalism, “100 percent Americanism,” and the
resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s.247 But, generally, the
maxim was not promoted to the same degree as it had been in the
nineteenth century and all but disappeared in legal treatises and
political histories, the latter field, now dominated by members of
the “Progressive” school of history which emphasized the nation’s
social and economic inequalities, not America’s exceptionalism.248
This may suggest that aside from the resurgence of Christian
nationalism in popular literature in the late-twentieth century, the
Christian nation maxim is dead as a legal concept. Certainly, the
Supreme Court’s initial church-state decisions were hostile to
claims of a religious basis for government or law. Both Everson v.
Board of Education (1947) and McCollum v. Board of Education
(1948), with their embrace of a strict-separationist approach to
church-state relations, presumed the secular nature of the law and
government.249 “The Constitution requires, not comprehensive
identification of state with religion, but complete separation,” wrote
Justice Wiley Rutledge.250 In fact, a main criticism of the Court’s
DEMOCRACY 1–18 (2019) (summarizing themes of Judeo-Christian America
from the First World War to the present).
246. RICHARD V. PIERARD & ROBERT D. LINDER, CIVIL RELIGION AND THE
PRESIDENCY 153 (1988).
247. See WALTER A. MCDOUGAL, THE TRAGEDY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: HOW
AMERICA’S CIVIL RELIGION BETRAYED THE NATIONAL INTEREST 175-77 (2019).
248. See GASTON, supra note 245, at 46–59; see generally CHARLES A. BEARD,
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913).
249. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invoking
Jefferson’s “wall” between church and state (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330
U.S. 1, 16 (1947))); Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
250. Everson, 330 U.S. at 60 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also McCollum,
333 U.S. at 217 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (maintaining that a secular public
school was “a symbol of our secular unity”).
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decisions was that it had unnecessarily endorsed a legal and
cultural regime of secularism in conflict with the nation’s religious
traditions.251 That ongoing critique, combined with the rise of Cold
War anti-Communism and a spiritual reawakening in the 1950s,
led the justices to backtrack in their rhetoric in Zorach v. Clauson
(1952).252 There, a six-justice majority again reaffirmed the value
of church-state separation—“[t]here cannot be the slightest doubt
that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and
State should be separated”—while asserting that “[w]e are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being.”253 Even though the latter statement sounded reminiscent
of Christian nation rhetoric, it was consistent with the popular
religious rhetoric of the time, epitomized by President Dwight
Eisenhower’s iconic statement: “our form of government has no
sense unless it is founded in a deeply-felt religious faith, and I don’t
care what it is.”254
Likewise, the movements behind the eventual insertion of “one
nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, the adoption of “In
God we Trust” as the national motto, and its placement on U.S.
currency reflected a widespread desire to equate a sense of
religiosity with the “American Way of Life,” in contrast to godless
Communism.255 While both successful drives suggested a vague
sense of Christian nationalism, most scholars and church-state
advocates at the time perceived both affirmations to be innocuous—
“so conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional,” wrote
one legal scholar—and chiefly reflective of a national civil

251. See DANNEL MCCOLLUM, THE LORD WAS NOT ON TRIAL: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT’S PRECEDENT-SETTING MCCOLLUM RULING
193-208 (2008).
252. James E. Zucker, Better a Catholic Than a Communist: Reexamining
McCollum v. Board of Education and Zorach v. Clauson, 93 VA. L. REV. 2069,
2104-18 (2007).
253. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312–14 (1952).
254. KEVIN KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD 67–68 (2015); see generally
ROBERT S. ELLWOOD, THE FIFTIES SPIRITUAL MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN RELIGION
IN A DECADE OF CONFLICT (1997); MARK SILK, SPIRITUAL POLITICS: RELIGION AND
AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II (1989).
255. KRUSE, supra note 254, at 100–25. In fact, the chief group behind the
Pledge of Allegiance addition was the Knights of Columbus, a Catholic fraternal organization, not evangelical Protestants. Id. at 100–10.
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religion.256 In contrast, around the same time Congress rejected a
proposal to adopt an amendment to the Constitution that would
have declared that “[t]his Nation devoutly recognizes the authority
and law of Jesus Christ, Savior and Rule of nations through whom
are bestowed the blessings of Almighty God.”257 Ceremonial
acknowledgments of God were acceptable, but not an amendment
to make the Constitution officially “Christian.”258
Over the next two decades, the Supreme Court continued to
affirm the secular nature of the nation’s character, laws, and
institutions, though at times maintaining that the paradigm of
pluralism more accurately reflected the correct understanding of
church-state relations. In 1961, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Sunday closing laws, turning back challenges
based on both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause.259
Chief Justice Earl Warren went through legal gymnastics to
demonstrate that the laws were secular health-welfare regulations,
despite their admittedly religious origins.260 “In light of the
evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws through the centuries, and of
their more or less recent emphasis upon secular considerations, . . .
presently they bear no relationship to establishment of religion as
those words are used in the Constitution,” Warren concluded.261 In
a another church-state case that term the Court struck down a state
requirement that public office-holders affirm a belief in God.262
Like Sabbath laws, religious oaths were a relic of colonial times that
presupposed an interdependence between religion and
government.263
Rejecting that pattern, Justice Hugo Black
reaffirmed that the correct arrangement was one of church-state
separation as announced in Everson and McCollum.264
256. See id. at 98-100; see also FEA, supra note 16, at 50–51.
257. KRUSE, supra note 254, at 95–100.
258. See id.
259. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 428, 453 (1961).
260. See id. at 444–45.
261. See id. at 444.
262. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1961). For the other churchstate decisions during that term, see Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc.
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
263. See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490.
264. Id. at 492–96.
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Then, in 1962 and 1963, the high Court handed down two of its
more controversial and consequential church-state holdings ever,
Engel v. Vitale and School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, striking down prayer and Bible reading in the nation’s
public schools.265 Despite consciously employing moderating
rhetoric to counter claims that the decisions reflected an antireligious animus, both decisions put the justices squarely behind
the proposition that public schools, like other public institutions,
were to be secular: “a secular program of education.”266 The Court
acknowledged the nation’s religious heritage—it was “true that
religion has been closely identified with our history and
government”—but noted that “this Court has rejected
unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids
only governmental preference of one religion over another.”267 The
idea that America was a Christian nation that promoted Christian
principles through laws and policy was inconsistent with the
Court’s holdings.
In Engel and Schempp, the Court had affirmed that the
government’s stance toward religion should be one of “neutrality,”
rather than using the word “secularity.”268 That conscious use of
terminology supported the idea of religious pluralism as an
alternative paradigm to secularism.
So, in Walz v. Tax
Commission, the Court upheld the longstanding practice of states
providing property tax exemptions for houses of worship.269
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that
the proper stance of the government toward religion should be one
of “benevolent neutrality” so as to “permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference.”270 The implication
was that the government should not impose a regime of secularism,
265. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
266. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (“We agree of course that the State may
not establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or
showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe.’ We do not agree, however, that this decision in any
sense has that effect.”); Engel, 370 U.S. at 433-35.
267. Schempp 374 U.S. at 212, 216.
268. Id. at 226 (“In the relationship between man and religion, the State is
firmly committed to a position of neutrality.”).
269. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 677-80 (1970).
270. Id. at 669.
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but one of neutrality toward religion that fostered religious
pluralism, a point Justice William Brennan made clearer by
asserting that the government “grants exemptions to religious
organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of
American society.”271 But this idea that the government could
promote religious pluralism, even though a step beyond
maintaining a stance of secularism, was still quite modest, with
Burger noting that this authority was permissive, not mandated on
the government, and that the Constitution simply allowed for a
“play in the joints” between the free exercise and establishment
clauses.272 This was a far cry from imposing a mandate upon the
government to accommodate religion because of America’s heritage
as a Christian nation.
IV. THE REEMERGENCE OF THE MAXIM

The perspective that the Constitution established a regime of
either secularity or religious neutrality continued into the early
1980s, with the Court highlighting the need for government to
maintain a secular stance in cases involving religion in public
schools and public funding of religious schools273 and a neutral
stance—permitting an accommodation to advance religious
pluralism—in cases involving religious conduct.274
That approach began to unravel, gradually, beginning in the
1980s. Several factors external to the Court helped to initiate this
shift. The first was the rise of the Religious Right, a movement of
conservative Protestants who reacted to a cultural secularization
brought on by the social revolution of the 1960s, the secularization
of the academy, the school prayer decisions, Roe v. Wade, and the
government’s revocation of tax exemptions for Christian
segregationist educational institutions.275 Religious Right leaders
271. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
272. Id. at 669 (majority opinion).
273. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–43 (1980); Comm. for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619–
20, 625 (1971).
274. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276–77 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 236 (1972).
275. FEA, supra note 16, at 54–55; MATTHEW C. MOEN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 15–43 (1992); KENNETH D. WALD &
ALLISON CALHOUN-BROWN, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 191–
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disagreed among themselves whether the nation’s government and
institutions had been founded on Christian principles but had
drifted from those moorings, or whether the nation’s Founders had
wrongfully abjured those principles in establishing the new
government.276 Despite those divergent views of the founding, both
camps agreed on two essential points: the true authority for
government came from God; and it was time for the nation to
recognize that authority and for conservative Christians to
(re)impose Christian values on the nation’s laws and
institutions.277
During this time a new generation of Christian nationalist
authors emerged, gaining popularity among conservative
evangelicals. Two early influential figures were Rousas John
Rushdoony and Francis Schaeffer. Rushdoony was the founder of
Christian Reconstructionism or “Dominion Theology,” which
advocates establishing a Biblical theocratic republic based on Old
Testament law and “the Lordship of Jesus Christ,” whereas
Schaeffer argued for a tradition of biblical principles for
government that went back to the Protestant Reformation.278 Both
writers were highly influential on a generation of Religious Right
leaders including Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, D. James Kennedy
and a host of authors of popular histories about the founding,
including John Whitehead, David Barton, Tim LaHaye, and Gary
DeMar, among others.279
The second external event, facilitated in part by the first, was
the election of Ronald Reagan as president and the alignment of the
Republican Party with more culturally and morally conservative
positions, including opposition to abortion, feminism, gay rights,

224 (Traci Crowell & Mary Malley eds., Rowman & Littlefield 8th ed. 2018)
(1987).
276. FREDERICK CLARKSON, ETERNAL HOSTILITY: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN
THEOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY 83–87 (1997).
277. Id.
278. ROBERT BOSTON, WHY THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 182–185 (1993); CLARKSON, supra note 276,
at 77–89; SARA DIAMOND, ROADS TO DOMINION: RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS AND
POLITICAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 246–249 (1995); FEA, supra note 16, at
54–56; JULIE J. INGERSOLL, BUILDING GOD’S KINGDOM: INSIDE THE WORLD OF
CHRISTIAN RECONSTRUCTION 14–27 (2015).
279. BOSTON, supra note 278, at 189–91; FEA, supra note 16, at 57–75;
INGERSOLL, supra note 278, at 14–27.
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and church-state separation. This in turn brought about an
alliance between the Republican Party and Christian conservatives
and their leaders who espoused Christian nationalist ideas.280
Reagan supported a constitutional amendment to permit prayer in
public schools and legislation to restrict abortion access.281 And as
noted, Reagan and then President George W. Bush regularly used
rhetoric laced with forms of the Christian nation narrative.282
That realignment, aided by twenty-plus years of Republican
control of the White House, impacted the composition of the federal
judiciary. Prior to the early-1970s, the judicial philosophy and
personal ideology of Republican-appointed federal judges did not
vary that considerably from Democrat-appointed judges,
particularly at the lower court level.283 That began to change,
beginning with the appointment of William Rehnquist in 1973, as
the social conservativism of nominees increasingly became a factor,
as could be seen in the appointments of Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, John Roberts, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett
Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, not to mention dozens of
lower appellate judges.284 Although none of the people appointed
to the Supreme Court espoused Christian nationalist views, their
conservative political and social perspectives, combined with their
embrace of originalism with its emphasis on rediscovering “original
understandings” of constitutional values from the founding era,
made them sympathetic to mild versions of the Christian nation
narrative.285

280. WALD & CALHOUN-BROWN, supra note 275, at 198–99, 205–08.
281. ASSOC. PRESS, Reagan Proposes School Prayer Amendment, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/18/us/reagan-proposesschool-prayer-amendment.html [perma.cc/J8S6-QAJU]; Steven V. Roberts,
Reagan Backs Anti-Abortion Bill As Opponents Resume Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 9, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/09/us/reagan-backs-antiabortion-bill-as-opponents-resume-filibuster.html [perma.cc/9K2X-SFCW].
282. DAVID DOMKE & KEVIN COE, THE GOD STRATEGY: HOW RELIGION
BECAME A POLITICAL WEAPON IN AMERICA 50–51, 53–61 (2008).
283. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV.
301, 310-17 (2016); see generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
284. See LAURA KALMAN, THE LONG REACH OF THE SIXTIES: LBJ, NIXON, AND
THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY SUPREME COURT 307–31 (2017).
285. WALD & CALHOUN-BROWN, supra note 275, at 90–92.
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The first modern Supreme Court decision to rely on the nation’s
purported Christian heritage to resolve a church-state conflict was
the 1983 case of Marsh v. Chambers, upholding the practice of paid
legislative chaplains.286 Declining to apply the analytical standard
from Lemon v. Kurtzman, with its secular purpose and primary
religious effect inquiries, Chief Justice Burger applied a historical
pedigree test.287 Noting that the First Congress had authorized the
appointment of paid chaplains three days before finalizing the
language of the First Amendment, Burger asserted syllogistically
that this “historical evidence sheds light . . . on what the draftsmen
intended the Establishment Clause to mean.”288 The holding did
not turn solely on that timing coincidence, however; Burger also
insisted that public prayer was “part of the fabric of our society.”289
“To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making
the laws is not, in these circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of
religion,” Burger wrote, and he concluded by quoting Zorach for the
principle that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being.”290 Although justices had previously
relied on historical data to inform their understanding of the
purposes of the religion clauses,291 Marsh was the first decision in
which historical “facts” were determinative of constitutionality.292
Burger’s reliance on a mild version of the Christian nation
narrative was not a one-shot deal. The following year he authored
an opinion upholding the public display of a city-owned nativity
scene during Christmastime.293 This time, the practice lacked the
same direct historical pedigree as legislative prayer; Burger could
point to no contemporaneous practice of the government erecting
286. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
287. See id. at 786-92.
288. Id. at 786-90.
289. Id. at 792.
290. Id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
291. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 267–278 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 213–20 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 8–14 (1947); id. at 31-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“No provision of the
Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating history
than the religion clause of the First Amendment.”).
292. Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1171, 1210 (2009).
293. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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religious symbols.294 Undeterred, Burger relied on what he
described as “an unbroken history of official acknowledgement[s]
. . . of the role of religion in American life.”295 That history was
“replete with official references to the value and invocation of
Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the
Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders.”296 Burger then
provided a laundry list of official declarations, proclamations, and
events: Thanksgiving proclamations, declarations of a National
Day of Prayer, the adoption of the national motto, and the insertion
of “One nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.297 In no
place did Burger discuss the context behind the acts or what
political reasons may have motivated public officials to employ
religious rhetoric.298 These declarations were simply part of the
“traditions” and “heritage” that underlay the nation’s founding.299
This “history,” Burger declared, “reveals . . . the contemporaneous
understanding of the guarantees” of the religion clauses.300
Burger’s second foray into a Christian nation narrative drew the ire
of Justice Brennan, who in a dissent remarked that “[b]y insisting
that such a distinctively sectarian message is merely an
unobjectionable part of our ‘religious heritage,’ the Court takes a
long step backwards to the days when Justice Brewer could
arrogantly declare of the Court that ‘this is a Christian nation.’”301
Arguments that the nation’s religious heritage and traditions,
revealed through official declarations concerning religion, should
control the outcome in church-state controversies surfaced in later
cases. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice Kennedy criticized
the majority’s use of a “no-religious endorsement” standard to

294. See id. at 672-78. According to Justice Kennedy, “displays commemorating religious holidays were not commonplace in 1791.” County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
295. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673–74.
296. Id. at 675.
297. Id. at 675–77.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 677-78.
300. Id. at 677.
301. Id. at 717–18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892)) (internal citation omitted).

476 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.26:430
strike the display of a creche inside a county courthouse.302 Such
an approach, Kennedy argued, “would invalidate longstanding
traditions” of public acknowledgements of Christianity, and
Kennedy supported his position by referencing not only the familiar
litany of Thanksgiving proclamations and National Day of Prayer
declarations but also the mythological claim of George Washington
kneeling in prayer at Valley Forge.303 The “meaning of the
[Establishment] Clause is to be determined by reference to
historical practices and understandings,” apparently informed by
the Christian nation narrative.304 Similarly, in Lee v. Weisman,
which struck down the practice of prayers at public school
graduation ceremonies, Justice Scalia argued in his dissent for
allowing the prayers based on events such as the Declaration of
Independence’s invocation of “divine Providence” and George
Washington’s first inaugural address and first Thanksgiving
Proclamation with their acknowledgements of the nation’s
dependence on the “Great Lord and Rules of Nations.”305 Although
these various references could be dismissed as merely reflections of
a civil religion, they still rely on a particular interpretation of
history that emphasizes the allegedly religious influences on the
nation’s founding, influences that should control church-state
adjudication today.
That a narrative about the purported religious influences on
the founding began appearing in Court decisions after 1980 was not
by happenstance. County of Allegheny marked the beginning of
what would become a growing cottage industry that continues to
this day: the filing of amicus curiae briefs by Religious Right
advocacy groups. Two Religious Right groups filed briefs in
Alleghany—Concerned Women for America and National Legal
Foundation—with both alleging there was a close relationship

302. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669–75 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303. Id. at 671–72. There is no evidence to support the claim of Washington
kneeling in prayer at Valley Forge. See Paul Boller, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND
RELIGION 10 (1963).
304. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
305. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633–35, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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between Christianity and the nation’s founding.306 As the former’s
brief asserted:
Religion, by virtue of history and tradition, was so
enmeshed in American culture that the Establishment
Clause could not, even if that were the desired result,
entirely sever government from religion. . . .
....
Both before and after the drafting and enactment of the
First Amendment, governmental acknowledgment of a
Supreme Being was a naturally accepted feature of
American public life. The Framers of the Constitution and
government officials invoked the name of God, asked his
blessings upon our Nation, and encouraged our people to
do the same.307
The practice of filing amicus briefs grew steadily through the
1990s as more Religious Right organizations entered the picture:
the American Center for Law and Justice; the Rutherford Institute;
Liberty Council; the Alliance Defense Fund (now, Alliance
Defending Freedom); and the Christian Legal Society, among
others. The legal disputes the Court heard during that decade did
not lend themselves to arguments about the nation’s religious
founding. In the new century, however, the Court heard several
cases that invited arguments about the nation’s purported religious
founding. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the
justices considered the contentious issue of removing the words
“under God” from the Pledge of Allegiance.308 The case elicited a
plethora of amicus briefs that argued the phrase was consistent
with, if not mandated by, the nation’s religious heritage.309 The
nation’s “founding documents acknowledge God,” asserted the brief
of Liberty Counsel and Wallbuilders (the organization of Christian
nationalist David Barton), which was chocked full of religious
306. Brief for Concerned Women for America as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (No. 87-2050),
1988 WL 1026116, at *4 [hereinafter Brief for Concerned Women for America];
Brief for National Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (No. 87-2050), 1988 WL 1026118, at *2–*9.
307. Brief for Concerned Women for America, supra note 306, at *4, *9.
308. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
309. Id. at 3–5.
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statements by presidents and other political figures.310 “[W]ithout
our belief in God, there is no foundation for our belief in the
inalienable rights given by God.”311 Other amicus briefs made
similar claims.312 “We cannot read the history of our rise and
development as a nation, without reckoning with the place the Bible
has occupied in shaping the advances of the Republic,” asserted the
Institute in Basic Life Principles.313 “Thus it establishes a
philosophy that God is a ruler and that His transendent [sic] laws
are to govern and be the guide for, and superior, to man’s laws.
That does not establish a religion, but the legal philosophy of
government of these United States.”314 Those amici were cheated
out of a hoped-for confirmation from the Court that the nation
existed “under God” when the majority side-stepped the issue,
holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the recitation
of the Pledge.315
310. Brief of Liberty Counsel et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624), 2003
WL 23051982, at *6–*8.
311. Id. at *2.
312. See, e.g., Brief of the Knights of Columbus as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 2003 WL 23011469, at *2–
*4 (“Our government is founded on the concept of the individuality and the
dignity of the human being. Underlying this concept is the belief that the human person is important because he was created by God and endowed by Him
with certain inalienable rights which no civil authority may usurp.”); Brief of
the Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Newdow,
542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 2003 WL 23010742, at *10 (“From the earliest days
of colonization to the inception and expansion of the American Republic, our
nation’s government has never been symbolically neutral with regard to the
existence and providence of God.”); Brief of Pacific Justice Institute as Amicus
Curiae Supporting of Petitioners, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 2003 WL
23002712, at *2 (The phrase “‘under God’ in the pledge . . . is merely a restatement of the political philosophy underpinning this nation’s form of government.”).
313. Brief of the Institute in Basic Life Principles et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 2003 WL 23112949,
at *12.
314. Id at *9.
315. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 16–18. In his concurring opinion urging the
Court to rule on the merits, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
To the millions of people who regularly recite the Pledge, and who
have no access to, or concern with, such legislation or legislative history, “under God” might mean several different things: that God has
guided the destiny of the United States, for example, or that the
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Christian nation proponents had an opportunity to press their
claims before the Court the following year when the justices heard
two cases involving the display of the Ten Commandments on
public property: Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v.
ACLU.316 In those two cases, the justices issued seemingly
contradictory rulings, upholding a Ten Commandments monument
on the Texas Capitol grounds in Van Orden while striking Ten
Commandments plaques hung in Kentucky county courthouses in
McCreary County.317 The issue of the nation’s Christian heritage
was front and center as the Kentucky displays were justified on the
ground that the “Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced
the formation of Western legal thought and the formation of our
country. . . . The Ten Commandments provide the moral
background of the Declaration of Independence and the foundation
of our legal tradition.”318 Again, an onslaught of amicus briefs
raised Christian nation claims.319
“Our laws, our form of
government, and our political history are not understandable
without reference to the biblical ethical monotheism,” asserted the
amicus brief for the Family Research Council, an organization

United States exists under God’s authority. How much consideration
anyone gives to the phrase probably varies, since the Pledge itself is a
patriotic observance focused primarily on the flag and the Nation, and
only secondarily on the description of the Nation. The phrase “under
God” in the Pledge seems, as a historical matter, to sum up the attitude of the Nation’s leaders, and to manifest itself in many of our public observances.
Id. at 26 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
316. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion);
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005). Justice Breyer was the
deciding fifth vote in both Van Orden and McCreary County, with the other
eight justices voting consistently to allow or disallow the displays. Van Orden,
545 U.S. at 679; McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 848.
317. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681; McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 850.
318. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 856 (quoting Appendix to Petition for
Certiorari at 189a, McCreary County, 545 U.S. 844 (No. 03-1693)).
319. See, e.g., Brief of the Family Research Council, Inc. & Focus on the
Family as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioners, McCreary County v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No. 03-1693) [hereinafter Brief of the Family Research Council, Inc. and Focus on the Family]; Brief of the National Legal
Foundation as Amicus Curiae, ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th
Cir. 2003) (No. 01-5935) [hereinafter Brief of the National Legal Foundation].
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founded by Religious Right leader James Dobson.320 Likewise, the
National Legal Foundation declared that “authoritative voices
establish that the Ten Commandments impacted law and
jurisprudence in America.”321
In his plurality opinion upholding the Ten Commandment
monument in Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist borrowed
evidence from the amicus briefs, though he stopped short of
embracing their conclusions.322 Quoting from Lynch, Rehnquist
reaffirmed the “unbroken history of official acknowledgement . . . of
the role of religion in American life,” then, going a step further to
specify that that included, “[r]ecognition of the role of God in our
Nation’s heritage,” as well.323 After citing to Washington’s
Thanksgiving Proclamation for that general proposition, he segued
to more recent “acknowledgements of the role played by the Ten
Commandments in our Nation’s heritage.”324 Missing from that
discussion was any citation to official acknowledgements or use of
the Ten Commandments coincident to the founding, in part because
such historical evidence is lacking.325 As Christian nationalists are
apt to do, however, Rehnquist was happy to draw from generalities
to reach a specific conclusion.
In contrast to the Van Orden plurality, Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion in McCreary openly embraced the Christiannation narrative.326 “Those who wrote the Constitution believed
that morality was essential to the well-being of society and that
encouragement of religion was the best way to foster morality,”
Scalia wrote.327 Based on the historical record of religious
320. Brief of the Family Research Council, Inc. & Focus on the Family, supra note 319, at 14.
321. Brief of the National Legal Foundation, supra note 319, at 2.
322. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. 686–89 (plurality opinion).
323. Id. at 686–87 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984)).
324. Id. at 689. Rehnquist noted that “President Washington’s [Thanksgiving] proclamation directly attributed to the Supreme Being the foundations
and successes of our young Nation.” Id. at 686–87.
325. See Brief of Legal Historians & Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6–26, McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No.
01-5939) [hereinafter Brief of Legal Historians]; see generally Steven K. Green,
The Fount of Everything Just and Right? The Ten Commandments as a Source
of American Law, 14 J. L. & REL. 525 (1999).
326. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 887, 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 887.
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declarations and proclamations, Scalia asserted, the Constitution
did not require government neutrality toward religion but it could
favor the prevailing religion of the people: “With respect to public
acknowledgement of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our
Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits
this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities,
just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”328 With that
language, Justice Scalia indicated how a Christian nation
perspective might be applied in law.
For nine years following the Ten Commandments cases, the
Court’s church-state docket provided little opportunity for applying
a Christian nation approach. In 2014, however, the justices
revisited the issue of prayers in legislative forums in Town of Greece
v. Galloway.329 That issue again invited arguments based on the
perceived religious practices of the Founders and of their purported
intent for government to foster religion.330 The town and several of
its supporting amici argued for the constitutionality of public
invocations based on Marsh and the historical legacy of such
practices.331 Other supporting amici, however, raised broader
claims, with one citing George Washington’s First Thanksgiving
Proclamation for the proposition that “[i]t is the duty of all nations
to acknowledge the providence of the Almighty God.”332 The
Declaration of Independence was crafted “in prayer and Bible
study,” claimed another amici.333 “The institutions of our society
are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the
authority of the State; That There Is a Moral Law Which the State
328. Id. at 893.
329. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569-570 (2014).
330. See id. at 576–77.
331. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696); Brief
for the State of South Carolina as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1314, Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696); Brief for the United States as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696).
332. Brief of Foundation for Moral Law as of Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 19, Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696) (quoting McCreary
County, 545 U.S. at 887 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Brief of WallBuilders,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner and supporting reversal at
13–23, Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696).
333. Motion for Leave to File Brief out of Time and Brief of The Faith &
Action Networks as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 2, Galloway,
572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696).
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Is Powerless to Alter; That the Individual Possesses Rights,
Conferred by the Creator or, Which Government Must Respect.”334
Once again, the Court’s opinion upholding the practice steered clear
of any express Christian nation rationalization: “[a]s practiced by
Congress since the framing of the Constitution,” wrote Justice
Kennedy, “legislative prayer lends gravity to public business,
reminds lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a
higher purpose, and expresses a common aspiration to a just and
peaceful society.”335 Yet Justice Kennedy opened the door to the
Court’s greater use of history in ways that might be determinative.
Rather than Marsh representing an exception to the Establishment
Clause, Kennedy remarked, “the Establishment Clause must be
interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and
understandings.’”336 “Any test the Court adopts must acknowledge
a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”337 In so stating,
Kennedy provided no guidance as to what counts as an “accepted”
historical practice or how courts are to determine the relevance of
one practice over another.338 Even Justice Thomas acknowledged
that “the relationship between church and state in the fledgling
Republic was far from settled at the time of ratification.”339 Yet
Thomas’s colleagues believed that some consensus understanding
could be divined; as Justice Alito declared in his concurring opinion
(with Justice Scalia) that cited the same historical confluence as
was highlighted in Marsh:
This Court has often noted that actions taken by the
First Congress are presumptively consistent with the Bill
of Rights, and this principle has special force when it comes
to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause. This
Court has always purported to base its Establishment

334. Id. at 5–6.
335. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 575.
336. Id. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
337. Id. at 577 (citing County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
338. See id. at 575–78.
339. Id. at 606 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
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Clause decisions on the original meaning of that
provision. . . .
There can be little doubt that the decision
in Marsh reflected the original understanding of the First
Amendment.340
Unfortunately, neither Justice Breyer’s nor Justice Kagan’s
dissenting opinions challenged the majority’s reliance on history or,
except in a passing footnote, its historical interpretation of the
practice of legislative prayers.341
Town of Greece, like Marsh before it, was, in many ways, an
easy decision because of the clear example of legislative chaplains
and public prayer concurrent to the founding.342 That clarity
becomes more oblique when an exact historical pedigree is missing.
This is where Christian nation arguments become more troubling
and misleading because they invite the Court to rule by analogy—
does President Washington’s issuance of a Thanksgiving
proclamation also validate a government-owned religious
symbol?343 This was the situation in 2019 with the case of
American Legion v. American Humanist Association, a challenge to
a thirty-two foot Latin cross monument erected on government
property alongside a prominent thoroughfare.344 The cross had
stood at its location since 1925 as a tribute to local soldiers who had
died in World War I.345 But the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
had held the cross represented an unconstitutional endorsement of
340. Id. at 602 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
341. See id. at 610 (Breyer, J., dissenting); See id. at 615 (Kagan, J., dissenting). In her brief challenge to the majority’s interpretation of the historical
record, Justice Kagan argued that official prayers during the founding period
were overwhelmingly inclusive in nature and couched in nonsectarian language, a record that would not support the practice in Greece. Id. at 619 n.1.
342. See id. at 576 (majority opinion).
343. Cf. Alex J. Luchenister & Sarah R. Goetz, A Hollow History Test: Why
Establishment Clause Cases Should Not Be Decided through Comparisons with
Historical Practices, 68 CATH. U.L. REV. 653, 679–80 (2019) (“Even if [presidential prayer proclamations] are . . . consistent with the intent of the First
Amendment, they shed little light on how to decide church state controversies
in other matters. . . . The Thanksgiving proclamations issued by early presidents were nonsectarian, ecumenical, isolated written statements that were
not presented in coercive environments.”).
344. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2077–78 (2019).
345. Id. at 2074.
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Christianity,346 which triggered an alarm among religious
conservatives who again flooded the Court with amicus briefs
arguing for constitutionality based on historical practices and
traditions.347 Again, claims of the nation’s Christian foundations
and the piety of the nation’s Founders figured prominently in many
amicus briefs supporting the cross. “From the Republic’s inception
its Founders embraced governmental expressions of religious belief,
unabashedly intertwining the secular and religious,” argued a
group of professors from conservative Christian colleges.348 The
Founders engaged in religious expression, the Billy Graham
Evangelistic Crusade asserted, because they “understood that
religious beliefs and ethical principles provided a foundation for,
and helped the preservation of, the type of government that they
had set up in the Constitution.”349 No brief went as far as the one
by the Foundation for Moral Law, however, which boldly asserted
that “all valid human law must rest upon the Revealed Law, which
is ‘to be found only in the Holy Scriptures,’ and on the Law of
Nature, ‘which is expressly declared so to be by God himself.’”350
The brief then cited favorably from the 1811 Ruggles blasphemy
decision for the proposition that “whatever strikes at the root of
Christianity, tends manifestly to the dissolution of civil
government.”351 Leaving little to doubt about its position, the brief
concluded by asserting that “we constantly speak of this republic as
a Christian nation¾in fact, as the leading Christian nation of the
346. Id. at 2079.
347. See, e.g., Brief of Citizens United et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No. 171717) [hereinafter Brief of Citizens United et al.]; Brief of the Foundation for
Moral Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct.
2067 (No. 17-1717) [hereinafter Brief of the Foundation for Moral Law]; Brief
of Various Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioners, Am. Legion,
139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717, 18-18) [hereinafter Brief of Various Professors];
Brief of Veterans in Defense of Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners and urging reversal, Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717, 1818) [hereinafter Brief of Veterans in Defense of Liberty et al.].
348. Brief of Various Professors, supra note 347, at 8; see also Brief of
Citizens United et al., supra note 347, at 21–25.
349. Brief of Veterans in Defense of Liberty et al., supra note 347, at 11.
350. Brief of the Foundation for Moral Law, supra note 347, at 19-20
(quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 41–
42 (Robert Bell 1772) (1765-69)).
351. Id. at 20 (quoting People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811)).
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world. The popular use of the term certainly has significance.”352
The connection between such “historical” arguments and the
Christian nation maxim was finally in the open.353
Unlike in Marsh and Town of Greece with the founding era
example of chaplains, the Court in American Legion lacked any
direct example of government-sponsored religious symbols at the
time of the founding—the closest examples provided in the briefing
were privately erected crosses and crosses found in government
cemeteries.354 Undeterred, Justice Alito declared that the Court’s
approach in such disputes was one that “looks to history for
guidance.”355 The void of historical evidence, though, forced Justice
Alito to analogize to other practices and declarations.356 Alito
offered a laundry list, referencing Washington’s Thanksgiving
Proclamation and his Farewell Address (perennial favorites),
legislative chaplaincies, and even American cities with religious
names (e.g., San Diego, Los Angeles) to demonstrate a tradition of
official use of religious language and of government recognition of
religion generally.357 This allowed Alito to blithely conclude that
“[w]here categories of monuments, symbols, and practices with a
longstanding history follow in that tradition, they are likewise
constitutional.”358
This expansive view of relevant history and traditions has
relieved the justices from relying on more robust Christian nation
arguments. Still, there can be no denying that such arguments
have been in the background of religious symbolism cases as the
dissenting opinions in Van Orden and McCreary County
acknowledged.359 The constant barrage of amicus briefs raising
claims of the nation’s religious heritage and of the religious beliefs
352. Id. at 28 (citing DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN
NATION 12 (1905)).
353. Id. at 19–20, 28.
354. Brief of Various Professors, supra note 347, at 3, 16-19.
355. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087 (2019) (plurality opinion).
356. See id. at 2087–89.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 2089.
359. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 895–900 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 722–35 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing arguments that raise a “Christian nation” rationale).
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of the Founders, purportedly demonstrated by their occasional use
of religious rhetoric, has no doubt had a subtle effect on those judges
who are already predisposed to such arguments and are otherwise
hostile to the previous legal regime of church-state separation. The
emboldened Christian nation arguments have helped to install a
jurisprudence of “Christian nation light.”
V. BAD HISTORY360

For decades, legal historians have scrutinized and criticized
the use of history by lawyers and courts.361 The term “law office
history” has become synonymous for the use of history in
adversarial legal proceedings where lawyers and judges rely on
incomplete historical accounts to reach a particular legal
outcome.362
Instead of approaching the historical record
dispassionately and with a critical eye as professional historians
are trained to do, history for lawyers and judges is merely another
form of evidence or argumentation to support a desired legal
result.363 As Charles Miller once related sarcastically: “[f]or
certainty in the law a little bad history is not too high a price to
pay.”364
One particularly pernicious form of law office history is
originalism. As promoted by the late-Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas, originalism searches for the “original meaning” or
“understanding” of a constitutional principle or provision and then
360. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 485 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor as “based on bad history”).
361. E.g., CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF
HISTORY 25 (1969); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past:
History and Constitutional Justice, 65 FORD. L. REV. 1611, 1611–12 (1997);
Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995); Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—And
Through It, 65 FORD. L. REV. 1627, 1627-29 (1997); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity
Through History (Or To It), 65 FORD. L. REV. 1587, 1587–88 (1997).
362. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP.
CT. REV. 119 passim (1997).
363. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF
HISTORICAL THOUGHT passim (1970); see Steven K. Green, “Bad History”: The
Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1717, 1732–33 (2006).
364. MILLER, supra note 361, at 194 (quoting WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, ESSAYS
IN LAW AND HISTORY 24 (1946)).
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promises to apply that meaning with fealty to a current
constitutional conflict.365 For religion clause purposes, therefore,
an originalist would attempt to divine the original understanding
of free exercise and non-establishment and then apply that
understanding with rigor to determine the outcome of a dispute. As
Scalia asserted in his McCreary dissent, after documenting public
religious affirmations during the founding period, the
Establishment Clause “was enshrined in the Constitution’s text,
and these official actions show what it meant. . . . What is more
probative of the meaning of the Establishment Clause than the
actions of the very Congress that proposed it, and of the first
President charged with observing it?”366 Justice Thomas made an
even more explicit call for a “return to the original meaning” of the
Establishment Clause in his Van Orden concurrence, writing that:
[O]ur task would be far simpler if we returned to the
original meaning of the word “establishment” than it is
under the various approaches this Court now uses. The
Framers understood an establishment “necessarily to
involve actual legal coercion.” . . .
There is no question that, based on the original meaning of
the Establishment Clause, the Ten Commandments
display at issue here is constitutional.367
The lure of history for constitutional adjudication is
irresistible. History legitimizes legal arguments and judicial
decision-making by offering an aura of authority and objectivity.368
History purportedly serves as an external constraint on judicial
365. See generally Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent? 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887 (1985); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 661 (1987) [hereinafter
Rules for Originalists]; Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 159 (1996).
366. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 896–97 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
367. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693–94 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)).
368. MARK DE WOLF HOWE, GARDEN AND WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 167-68 (1967); Rules for
Originalists, supra note 365, at 660–61; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 CINN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989).
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subjectivity by providing an independent and non-ideological
source of information from which all parties can draw and upon
which all people can agree. As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has
observed, judges “want very much to make it appear that their
decisions are not based on their personal opinions, but instead are
derived from an external source.”369
This notion that there is an objective, consensus, and pellucid
interpretation of any historical event is ridiculous. Historians are
committed to objectivity, but they understand—in a manner that is
apparently incongruous to some jurists—that history is not
objective. Any exploration into history is selective, and all good
accounts of history are interpretive.370 The difference is that
historians recognize the selective and interpretive aspect to their
craft while jurists act as if such “shortcomings” are inconsistent
with a historical analysis instead of being part of the
undertaking.371 Historians also avoid efforts to identify “historical
truths.” Rather than mining pages of historical information to
uncover “truths,” historians seek explanation and illumination; the
study of history is not to provide “answers” to modern questions but
to provide understanding of our past in the hope it may inform the
present.372 In contrast, lawyers primarily approach history as
advocates seeking authority for the propositions they hope to
prove.373
The final fallacy of law office history (and originalism in
particular) is the failure to recognize the indeterminacy and
incompleteness of the historical record. We have only those
documents that have survived the ravages of time and have been

369. Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the
First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 908 (1993).
370. R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 218–19 (1964); FISCHER, supra note 363, at 4–5, 64–65.
371. Rules for Originalists, supra note 365, at 660–61 (“Historical judgments . . . necessarily involve elements of creativity and interpretative
choice.”).
372. FISCHER, supra note 363, at 40 (“It is no easy matter to tell the truth,
pure and simple, about past events; for historical truths are never pure, and
rarely simple.”).
373. Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601,
602 (1995).
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transcribed, compiled, and authenticated.374 No doubt, other
important, unrecorded discussions about the purpose and meaning
of the Establishment Clause took place during the House committee
on style, in the House debates, and in the Senate debate (which was
not recorded in the Senate Journal), let alone in the near-by
taverns.375 In addition, the records that do exist may be woefully
inaccurate, as they were transcribed by people who made mistakes
and self-edited as they went along (not to mention allegations that
the transcriber for the Annals of Congress was frequently
inebriated).376 Madison stated that the accuracy of the reported
debates of the First Congress was “not to be relied on”:
The face of the debates shews [sic] that they are defective,
and desultory, where not revised, or written out by the
Speakers. In some instances, he makes them inconsistent
with themselves, by erroneous reports of their speeches at
different times on the same subject. [The reporter] was
indolent and sometimes filled up blanks in his notes from
memory or imagination.377
In addition, remarks contained within documents whose accuracy
can be presumed can easily be misunderstood. The framers used
terms and phrases familiar to the late eighteenth century, and
frequently employed rhetoric that was intentionally vague,
For example, several
duplicitous, or loaded with irony.378
motivations can be read into Benjamin Franklin’s famous call for
prayer at the Constitutional Convention: personal piety; irony; or

374. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity
of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1986).
375. Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States,
47 OHIO. ST. L. REV. 409, 412–13 (1986).
376. See Hutson, supra note 374, at 36 (discussing the excessive drinking of
the reporter, Thomas Lloyd, and relating that his notes were “frequently garbled and that he neglected to report speeches whose texts are known to exist
elsewhere”).
377. Id. at 38 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Jan.
7, 1832), in Marion Tinling, Thomas Lloyd’s Reports of the First Federal Congress, 18 WM. & MARY Q. 519, 537–38 (1961) (emphasis in original)).
378. Laycock, supra note 375, at 413-14.

490 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.26:430
shaming the delegates into compromise.379 The Framers’ remarks
and letters also arose within particular contexts that may not be
apparent from the documents themselves. Therefore, the precise
meanings of recorded statements may be ambiguous at best.380
All of this suggests that history can easily be misunderstood
and manipulated by modern advocates and jurists. Those who
advance a Christian nation or “religious founding” narrative can
cherry-pick statements and present them as “facts” without having
to do the hard work of providing context, explanation, and possible
motivation. As the author of several amicus briefs that have
examined historical events, I can attest that court briefs with a
restricted word count are not the best mediums to explain historical
complexity and nuance.381 Although codes of legal ethics forbid an
attorney from lying or concealing evidence, there is little to prevent
one from presenting highly selective historical data accompanied by
a skewed interpretation (otherwise known as “advocacy”).
A prime example of the dangers of relying on history in
constitutional adjudication is represented in the case that ushered
in this approach: Marsh v. Chambers. As noted, Marsh parted from
the established analytical standard of asking whether a practice
violated current notions of non-establishment of religion, asking
instead whether the modern practice of legislative chaplaincies and
prayers had a historical basis.382 As discussed, Chief Justice
Burger boldly asserted that the practice of chaplaincies was

379. See THOMAS S. KIDD, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF A
FOUNDING FATHER 228–30 (2017); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP:
THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 194 (2016).
380. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he historical record is at best ambiguous, and statements can
readily be found to support either side of the proposition. The ambiguity of
history is understandable if we recall the nature of the problems uppermost in
the thinking of the statesmen who fashioned the religious guarantees; they
were concerned with far more flagrant intrusions of government into the realm
of religion than any that our century has witnessed.”).
381. See, e.g., Brief of Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 18-1195), 2019 WL 6169967; Brief of Amici
Curiae, Legal and Religious Historians in Support of Respondent, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016) (No. 15-577),
2016 WL 3667052.
382. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–92 (1983); see supra notes 286–
292 and accompanying text.
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supported by an “unambiguous and unbroken history of more than
200 years” and that the evidence demonstrated “clearly” that the
drafters of the First Amendment “did not view paid legislative
chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that
Amendment.”383
Neither of those claims survives a closer
examination. In his comprehensive review of legislative chaplains,
Professor Christopher Lund has remarked that the Court’s “view
of that history was deeply partial—partial in the sense of being a
bit slanted as well as partial in the sense of being somewhat
incomplete.”384
According to Lund, Chief Justice Burger’s
historical analysis omitted several important details, such as
contemporary objections to the practice and how later members of
Congress used chaplaincies to advance sectarian goals.385
“Marsh’s view of legislative prayer, ultimately, is a somewhat
idealized and romanticized one,” Lund notes.386 This slanted
history “perpetuates the very false illusion that the chaplaincies
were altogether innocuous and universally supported; it ignores all
the ways in which the chaplaincies were sometimes controversial
and divisive. In the end, the Court’s desire to portray the
chaplaincies as benign ends up distorting its historical analysis.”387
The same can be said for the majority opinion in Van Orden
and the dissenting opinions in McCreary County. As discussed
above, several amici argued the displays were permissible based on
acknowledgments of religion during the founding period while
claiming that the Ten Commandments were a central source for the
nation’s political and legal principles.388 These assertions no doubt
impacted the justices’ views about the legal pedigree of the
Commandments.389 Justice Scalia commended the Ten

383. Id. at 788, 792; see supra notes 293-301 and accompanying text.
384. Lund, supra note 292, at 1211.
385. Id at 1211-12.
386. Id. at 1173, 1211.
387. Id. at 1213.
388. See supra notes 318–21 and accompanying text.
389. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687 (“Recognition of the role of
God in our Nation’s heritage has also been reflected in our decisions. We have
acknowledged, for example, that ‘religion has been closely identified with our
history and government.’” (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 237 (1963))); Id. at 688 (“[A]cknowledgements of the role played by the
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Commandments’ “unique contribution to the development of the
legal system” and asserted that their frequent display “testifies to
the popular understanding that the Ten Commandments are a
foundation of the rule of the law, and a symbol of the role that
religion plays, and continues to play, in our system of
government.”390 Even Justice Souter stated in his majority opinion
in McCreary that he did not “deny that the Commandments have
had influence on civil or secular law.”391 Justices Scalia and Souter
are not alone, as the idea that the Commandments, as a legal code,
directly impacted the development of Western law (and American
law in particular) is widely shared.392 Yet, widely-held perceptions
can be wrong, particularly when they are based on anecdotes.
Professor Paul Finkelman and I have separately examined the
historical record, and we found no evidence that jurists and political
leaders contemporaneous to the founding claimed that the Ten
Commandments were a basis for American law or republican
government.393 To be sure, passing allusions to the
Commandments or Decalogue appear in contemporary sermons
(unsurprisingly) and in a smattering of statements by political
leaders,394 but as best can be determined, no person or persons of
influence asserted that the Commandments served as the
Ten Commandments in our Nation’s heritage are common throughout America.”).
390. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 905, 907 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
391. Id. at 869 (majority opinion).
392. Former federal judge, John T. Noonan, who wrote extensively about
church-state matters, asserted that the Ten Commandments are “the most influential law code in history.” JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVERS AND THE
POWERS THAT ARE 4 (1987). While former law professor Harold Berman declared that until recently, “if one had asked Americans where our Constitution¾or, indeed, our whole concept of law¾came from, on what it was ultimately based, the overwhelming majority of them would have said, ‘the Ten
Commandments’ or ‘the Bible.’” Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law: The
First Amendment in Historical Perspective 35 EMORY L.J. 777, 788–89 (1986).
393. Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn
and Elsewhere 73 FORD. L. REV. 1477, 1518–20 (2005); Green, supra note 325,
at 558.
394. In his book, Christian nationalist William J. Federer lists only a handful of statements by members of the founding generation praising the Ten
Commandments and he wrongly equates references to natural or higher law
with the Decalogue. Contra WILLIAM J. FEDERER, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN LAW, 17–38 (2003).
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foundation of American law or government, and there certainly was
no consensus about that point.395 Significantly, the debates of the
Constitutional Convention contained in Madison’s Notes are devoid
of any claims of the authority of the Ten Commandments or the
Bible generally.396 “In the wide-ranging debates—reprinted in
Madison’s Notes, the Annals of Congress, Farrand’s Records,
Elliot’s Debates, and elsewhere—the Founders mentioned Roman
law, European Continental law, British law, and various other legal
systems, but as can best be determined, no delegate ever mentioned
the Ten Commandments or the Bible.”397 Similarly, neither the
“Bible” nor “Scripture” nor the “Ten Commandments” appears in
the index of the Federalist Papers, which are generally considered
to contain the most important discussions of the meaning of the
United States Constitution at the time of ratification.398 The claim
that the “Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the
formation of Western legal thought and the formation of our
country” is not supported by history and is a legal fiction.399
These two examples demonstrate the danger of relying on
history to any significant degree to resolve a modern constitutional
dispute. As Justice Brennan observed several decades ago:
[T]he historical record is at best ambiguous, and
statements can readily be found to support either side of
the proposition. The ambiguity of history is
understandable if we recall the nature of the problems
uppermost in the thinking of the statesmen who fashioned
the religious guarantees; they were concerned with far
more flagrant intrusions of government into the realm of
religion than any that our century has witnessed.400

395. Green, supra note 325, at 543–48. In fact, in State v. Chandler, 2 Del.
553, 557 (1837), the court expressly disclaimed that the common law had ever
adopted “the laws of God as revealed in the old testament.”
396. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 (2d ed. 1984).
397. Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 325, at 13–22.
398. See generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
399. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 856, 879–81 (2005).
400. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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In addition to the indeterminacy of the historical record and its
questionable relevance to modern conflicts, historical analysis
lends itself to cherry-picking data. We should follow the wise words
of Justice Brennan that “[a] too literal quest for the advice of the
Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems . . . futile
and misdirected.”401
CONCLUSION

There is little danger—or at least one would hope¾that a
Supreme Court justice or appellate court judge would today make
a direct affirmation about America being a Christian nation in
either a legal or political sense as Justice Brewer did in 1892.402
Brewer’s declaration was criticized at the time403 and, as discussed,
has subsequently been repudiated by members of the Supreme
Court, including Justice Scalia.404 But the fact that Christiannationalist ideas and rhetoric are being pushed by advocates and
have influenced the Court’s decision making in subtle ways is more
troubling than a boldfaced declaration like that of Justice Brewer,
which at least had the advantage of transparency. Because of the
indeterminacy of the idea of the nation’s Christian founding, and
its visceral appeal to many people, a jurisprudence promoting a
narrative of “Christian nation light” may be more damaging to the
integrity of the idea of separation of church and state. For this
reason, people should not dismiss Christian nation rhetoric as
harmless to the Constitution’s religion clauses.

401. Id.
402. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471
(1892).
403. Green, supra note 208, at 427–28.
404. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717–18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra notes
236–37 and accompanying text.

